




COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 
SARA K. STADLER†
This Article identifies conflicting strands of the public interest in copyright, 
then proposes to mediate those conflicts by conceiving of copyright law as a pro-
hibition against acts of unfair competition.  Under this conception, copyright 
infringement would consist of the infliction of competitive harm in a “relevant 
market,” a market this Article proposes to define by asking what rights creators 
are entitled to expect when they engage in the act of creation.  As regards 
“printed works” (that is, works created for the purpose of existing in copies), 
this Article argues that creators are not entitled to expect the right to exclude 
others from engaging in acts of private copying, acts which, standing alone, do 
not serve as market substitutes to any significant extent.  Instead, creators are 
entitled to expect only the right to distribute those copies to the public—for only 
acts of public distribution are behaviors that threaten to cause the sorts of com-
petitive harms that Congress should seek to redress.  This Article concludes by 
revealing how such a copyright law might help to resolve a few of the issues at 
the very center of the copyright debate:  the pervasiveness of personal copying, 
the rise of contractual and technological access controls, and, of course, the 
“death” of the fair use defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In section 107 of the Copyright Act, Congress codified the defense 
known as “fair use,” under which qualifying, unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research [are] not . . . infringe-
ment[s] of copyright.”1  Scholars have described fair use, variously, as 
a remedy for “market failure,”2 and therefore a temporary substitute 
for functioning markets;3 a doctrine slouching toward irrelevance4 
1 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
2 Professor Wendy Gordon articulated this theory more than twenty years ago, and 
her work has inspired dozens of responses—too many to cite here.  See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1616 (1982) (“[F]air use implies the con-
sent of the copyright owner by looking to whether the owner would have consented 
under ideal market conditions.”). 
3 See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works:  The Development of 
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 125 (2003)  
(“[T]he ‘market failure’ genre of fair use should fade away in a world of perfect price 
discrimination . . . .”); Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:  
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 
155 (2003) (noting that the “excuse” type of fair use “should and does disappear if, 
because of institutional or technological change, the excusing circumstances disap-
pear”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem “Trans-
formed”:  Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 265 (1998) 
(“Implicit in Professor Gordon’s [market-failure] approach to fair use, however, is an 
element of temporal instability.”). 
4 See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
133, 137 (2003) (“For the great bulk of uses previously excused because of transaction 
costs, the [fair use] doctrine will simply become irrelevant.”). 
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and even death5 as markets become more sophisticated; a tool for ad-
vancing social goals when a finding of infringement promises to pro-
duce “bad results”;6 and a doctrine that is empty of substance7 and 
therefore “dangerous”8 because it creates the illusion that there are 
limits to an increasingly unlimited entitlement.  In other words, copy-
right scholars cannot agree on what, exactly, the fair use defense is for.  
What hope is there for the courts? 
Nowhere is this disagreement more apparent than in the dispute 
over the Google Library Project, in which Google proposes to scan 
every book owned by several university libraries and the New York 
Public Library.9  The resulting digital images would constitute a pow-
erful research tool:  not only would the images be searchable by key-
word but researchers also could view the results of their searches 
online in image form—along with bibliographic information enabling 
them to purchase (or borrow) the books of greatest interest.10  In 
5 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use:  Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 
906 (2005) (describing the “common claim, that fair use is dead”); cf. Robert C. Deni-
cola, Mostly Dead?  Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
193, 193-95 (2000) (discussing the death of copyright in the context of the death of 
other areas of law); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, Pri-
vate Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814 (2001) (ar-
guing that “[c]opyright is dead”).
6 Since publishing her groundbreaking article, supra note 2, Professor Gordon has 
defined “market failure” more broadly to take into account considerations of social 
justice.  She now believes that “it makes sense to use the term ‘market failure’ broadly, 
whenever we have grounds to believe that bad results will follow from adhering to the 
rule of owner deference.”  Gordon, supra note 3, at 164; see also Dan L. Burk & Julie E. 
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44 
(2001) (“The 2 Live Crew case thus is emblematic of a second type of market failure in 
which the value of socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works is not fully internal-
ized.”). 
7 See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396, 402 (2005) (arguing that “the statute itself has 
become not the embodiment of copyright’s blended nature, as Professor Weinreb ar-
gued, but a placeholder for all manner of arguments about limits” and that “[t]he sub-
stantive emptiness of fair use makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright 
analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas”). 
8 See Gordon, supra note 5, at 904 (discussing why fair use might be considered 
“dangerous”); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 185, 205 (criticizing the notion that “[w]e do not have to worry 
about the use of copyright to impede the dissemination of ideas and information . . . 
because fair use is there to privilege such uses”). 
9 See JONATHAN BAND, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, OITP TECHNOLOGY POLICY BRIEF:  THE GOOGLE 
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short, “[t]he Library Project [would] make it easier than ever before 
for users to locate the wealth of information buried in books.”11  Be-
cause some of those books would be copyrighted, Google has an-
nounced that if a search produced a “hit” on a copyrighted work, re-
searchers could view only a few sentences from that work, in the form 
of “snippets” surrounding the search term.12
When Google announced its project, authors and publishers ob-
jected, arguing that Google would be engaging in repeated acts of in-
fringement via the wholesale copying (scanning) of works in which it 
did not own the copyrights.13  This was a valid objection, for the Copy-
right Act, in section 106, gives copyright owners the “exclusive 
right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies” and to au-
thorize others to do the same.14  The word “copies” is defined broadly, 
in section 101, to include any “material objects . . . in which a work is 
fixed by any method now known or later developed.”15  Because com-
puter memory (whether volatile or nonvolatile16) is a “material ob-
ject,” digital scans of books stored in computer memory are “copies” 
for the purposes of section 106.  In response to these objections from 
authors and publishers, Google proposed a change to its policy under 
which copyright owners who did not wish their works to be scanned 
could “opt out” by November 1, 2005, the date on which Google 
planned to begin the expensive process of digitization.17  Unsatisfied 
with this solution, a group of authors sued Google on September 20, 
2005,18 and a group of publishers filed a similar lawsuit a month later, 
on October 19.19  The cases (together, “the Google case”) are pending 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.20
11 Id. at 9. 
12 Id. at 1-2.  If a search revealed a work in the public domain, researchers could 
browse the work in its entirety.  Id. at 1. 
13 Id. at 3-4. 
14 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
15 Id. § 101.
16 The information in volatile memory, such as “random access memory” (or 
“RAM”), is lost when power to the computer is interrupted.  By contrast, nonvolatile 
memory, such as a hard disc drive or a flash memory device (“thumb drive”), can re-
tain stored information even when the computer or device is not powered. 
17 BAND, supra note 9, at 2. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. 
20 See Complaint, Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/google/aggoog92005cmp.pdf; 
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Because the acts in which Google has engaged almost certainly 
constitute prima facie infringement, the fate of its library project likely 
depends on the application of the fair use defense.  Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act instructs courts to decide whether a disputed use is fair 
by evaluating four statutory factors.21  The Supreme Court has placed 
the most emphasis on the first (the commerciality of the use) and the 
fourth (the effect of the use on the market for the original), and it is 
easy to see why:  commercial uses are more likely than noncommercial 
ones to compete with sales of the copyrighted work.  Further, any such 
competition is likely to result in lower prices and reduced market 
share for everyone, and these market effects, in turn, are likely to di-
minish the profits of those erstwhile monopolists, the creators (and 
their assigns).  Faced with the prospect of earning lower profits, at 
least some potential creators are likely to forego the act of creation in 
favor of other, more profitable pursuits, thus leading to a decline in 
the number or the quality of works created.  Nobody wants that. 
The fair use defense would be easy to apply if commercial uses 
usurped the market for the copyrighted work, while noncommercial 
(“nonprofit educational”)22 ones did not.  But there are two problems 
with a fairness test for which commerciality is the linchpin:  First, the 
definition of “commercial” is becoming increasingly broad.  One 
might think that scholarly activities, at least, would be comfortably on 
the gratis side of the line.  Yet courts have found even the activities 
listed in section 107—including scholarship—to be commercial when 
users gain an indirect economic advantage by failing to pay the copy-
right owner for a license, thus depriving her of potential licensing 
revenue.23  As a number of scholars have noted, this inquiry is circu-
Complaint, McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005), 
available at  http://www.publishers.org/press/pdf/40%20McGraw-Hill%20v.%20Google.pdf. 
21 They are the following:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.   
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
22 See id. § 107(1).
23 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994); see 
also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that “the potential for destruction of this [licensing] market by widespread 
circumvention of the plaintiffs’ permission free system is enough . . . ‘to negate fair 
use’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 
(1985))). 
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lar.24  If depriving the copyright owner of licensing revenues were 
enough to make a use “unfair,” then the fair use defense would be no 
defense at all, for by definition, the fair use defense comes into play 
only when a defendant fails to pay for a license.  Recognizing this,25 
courts have asked whether the defendant has deprived the copyright 
owner of licensing revenues only in “traditional, reasonable, or likely 
to be developed markets.”26  The problem with this seemingly nar-
rower inquiry, however, is that copyright owners themselves can de-
fine whether markets for their works are “likely to be developed” by 
developing those markets themselves.  In other words, copyright own-
ers themselves can define away the market failure for which fair use is 
the remedy. 
The only exception to this rule appears to be that “‘[c]opyright 
owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets,’”27 
which reveals the second problem with using commerciality as a test of 
24 See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1257, 1277 n.98 (1998) (“In both cases, the courts adopted circular arguments 
that because a use could be licensed, it was no longer a fair use and must be licensed.”); 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (1997) (arguing that the Texaco court’s 
“circular reasoning of ‘lost’ permission fees will become conclusive on the fourth . . . 
[and] most important fair use factor” and that, “[t]herefore, allowing circular reason-
ing to determine [that] factor will often result in circularity dictating the outcome of a 
fair use case”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:  Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 975, 1021 (2002) (asserting that the Second Circuit employed circular reason-
ing when, following the market failure approach to fair use, it held in Texaco that copy-
ing articles from scientific journals at the request of, and for use by, researchers quali-
fied as copyright infringement); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4], at 13-197 (2006) [hereinafter NIMMER] (writing 
of the fourth statutory fair use factor, “how can one prove a potential [impact on the 
market for the copyrighted work] without simply degenerating into the tautology that 
defendant occupied a certain niche, which itself proves a potential market to exist and 
to have been usurped?”). 
25 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929 n.17 (“[W]ere a court automatically to conclude in 
every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply be-
cause the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the 
fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”). 
26 Id. at 930; see also id. (“‘The market for potential derivative uses includes only 
those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to de-
velop.’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994))); id. 
(observing that “the fourth factor [is] concerned with ‘“use that supplants any part of 
the normal market for a copyrighted work”’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 65 
(1975)))).
27 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 
2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 
Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
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fairness:  commerciality (or lack thereof) does not appear to be dispo-
sitive of fairness either way.  As the Supreme Court warned in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “the mere fact that a use is educational and 
not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any 
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fair-
ness.”28  The “purpose and character” of the use in Campbell was a  
2 Live Crew parody of the Roy Orbison classic “Oh, Pretty Woman,” 
but it was commercial nonetheless:  the song was being offered for 
sale in music stores nationwide, and 2 Live Crew (or more likely, its 
record company) was making money.29  Whether the rap group also 
was competing with Roy Orbison and his music publisher was another 
question.  Although it remanded this question to the district court, 
the Supreme Court seemed to think the answer was no.  “[A]s to par-
ody pure and simple,” the Court wrote, “it is more likely that the new 
work will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable 
under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.”30  Why not?  
Because a parody is transformative, not competitive.  It does not “‘su-
persede[]’” the original, but instead “adds something new, with a fur-
ther purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”31  According to the Court, “the 
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally fur-
thered by the creation of transformative works”32—even commercial 
ones. 
What does this mean for Google?  Under existing law, Google 
must show either market failure33 or transformation in order to prove 
its entitlement to the fair use defense.  This presents a considerable 
challenge.  Consider market failure first:  knowing that the district 
court is likely to ask whether Google has entered a market that is 
“likely to be developed” by the plaintiffs,34 at least one of the plaintiffs 
has hastened to develop such a market by announcing a searchable 
library of its own.  On December 12, 2005, HarperCollins issued a 
28 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
29 Id. at 573. 
30 Id. at 591. 
31 Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4901)). 
32 Id.
33 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1613 (arguing that “[i]n the ordinary copyright 
case, the court assumes that the defendant could have, and therefore should have, pro-
ceeded through the market”). 
34 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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press release in which it stated its intention to “create a digital ware-
house for all of its content” that would both “satisfy[] the demands of 
the marketplace” and “allow[] the publisher to remain in control of 
its digital files and intellectual property.”35  HarperCollins also has de-
scribed its goal as the “monetization” of its content.36  While the dis-
trict court might refuse to credit evidence of markets developed post 
hoc, it would be perfectly justified in holding that Google is depriving 
the plaintiffs of potential licensing revenues by providing the public 
with the means to search “monetiz[ed]” content for free.  Google 
used copyrighted works to enter a market, it did not pay to license 
rights in those works, and the market it entered was “likely to be de-
veloped” by the owners of copyright because at least one owner has 
actually developed it.37
Google faces a similar challenge in defining (or redefining) 
“transformative.”  While a handful of lower courts have stretched the 
definition to include mere reproductions,38 the Supreme Court in 
Campbell seems to have intended that “transformative” apply only to 
those derivative works in which a user takes expression from a copy-
35 Press Release, Erin Crum, Commc’ns Manager, HarperCollins Publishers, 
HarperCollins Publishers To Create Digital Content Warehouse (Dec. 12, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.harpercollins.com/footer/release.aspx?id=399&year=2005. 
36 Press Release, Erin Crum, Dir. Corp. Commc’ns, HarperCollins Publishers, 
HarperCollins Publishers Selects Newsstand, Inc. To Develop Global Digital Ware-
house (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://www.harpercollins.com/footer/ 
release.aspx?id=445&year=2006. 
37 To be sure, the market for permissions fails with respect to those works for 
which rights holders are difficult (if not impossible) to identify—as with, for example, 
books that have gone out of print.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the permissions requirement can inhibit or pre-
vent the use of old works . . . because the [copyright] holder may prove impossible to 
find”). 
38 In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found transformation in the reproduction of digital photographic images as part 
of a search engine.  336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).  Even though the images them-
selves were unchanged, except in size, the court noted that the defendant was using 
the images to “serve[] an entirely different function” than was the plaintiff—that is, 
“improving access to information on the internet versus artistic expression.”  Id. at 818-
19.  The court also found it unlikely that anyone using the search engine would be able 
to substitute the “thumbnail” reproductions for the original images, since “enlarging 
them sacrifices their clarity.”  Id. at 819; see also Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 
1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006) (listing reasons why “Google’s presentation of ‘Cached’ 
links to the copyrighted works at issue . . . does not serve the same functions” as did the 
original work).  But see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) (distinguishing Kelly because “Google’s use of thumbnails on its image search 
[is] far more commercial than Arriba’s use” and “Google’s thumbnails lead users to 
sites that directly benefit Google’s bottom line” through advertising revenues).
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righted work and adds expression of her own—creating, in the end, 
“something new,”39 like a biography, an editorial, or a parody.40  At the 
very least, according to the Court, a transformative work must “alter[]” 
a copyrighted work with “new expression, meaning, or message”;41 it 
would be difficult (although not impossible) to add new meaning or 
message without adding new expression, too.42  Judge Pierre Leval, 
whose article on fair use appears to have inspired the Supreme Court, 
probably had very much the same thing in mind.  As he wrote a few 
years before Campbell, a transformative work is one that “adds value to 
the original . . . in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.”43
Google is not doing any of these things; it simply is proposing to 
reproduce books in digital form, thus making them searchable online.  
It is engaging in unauthorized and untransformative, though unques-
tionably beneficial, copying.44  The benefits for researchers are obvi-
ous, but the publishing industry stands to gain as well.  If scanning 
39 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
40 In taking expression from a copyrighted work, the user should take care not to 
create a satire instead of a parody.  For at least one Justice,  
[i]t is not enough [for the purposes of fair use] that the parody use the origi-
nal in a humorous fashion, however creative that humor may be.  The parody 
must target the original, and not just its general style, the genre of art to 
which it belongs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original, it 
may target those features as well). 
Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
41 Id. at 579. 
42 In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., decided under the Copyright 
Act of 1909, one court did hold that the publishers of a “personal name index to the 
annual New York Times Index” had engaged in a fair use, in part because their activi-
ties “appear[ed] to have the potential to save researchers a considerable amount of 
time and, thus, facilitate the public interest in the dissemination of information.”  434 
F. Supp. 217, 219, 221 (D.N.J. 1977).  In that case, however, the defendants did not 
engage in the wholesale copying of protected works; indeed, they copied only the 
names of those persons appearing in the New York Times from 1851 through 1974.  Id. 
at 219.  Those names likely would not be held protectable today.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any . . . discovery . . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
349 (1991) (“Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to 
use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, 
so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrange-
ment.”). 
43 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 
(1990). 
44 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair:  A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1137, 1143 (1990) (“A use may serve an important, socially useful purpose with-
out being transformative, simply by making the copied material available.”). 
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books and making them searchable online leads researchers to find 
books that they otherwise might not have found, then a searchable li-
brary might help to expand the readership of books, thus leading to 
increased sales and increased borrowing from libraries (which, in 
turn, leads to increased sales).  Google also is providing these benefits 
at very low cost to the public, in significant part because nothing that 
Google proposes to do has the least chance of preventing writers from 
writing, or publishers from publishing.  Google is not competing with 
the publishing industry—as if, for example, it were enabling consum-
ers to read copyrighted books online.  In fact, it is not engaging in any 
activity in which the publishing industry—until now—has shown the 
remotest interest.  Unfortunately, however, none of these observations 
is particularly relevant to the current fair use inquiry. 
The late Professor L. Ray Patterson once observed that “[m]ost 
discussions of the fair use of copyrighted works provide answers with-
out ever asking the right question.  That question is not ‘what is fair 
use?’ but ‘what is copyright?’”45  If fair use has become “a bizarre, oc-
casionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copy-
right monopoly,”46 the fault lies not in the defense itself, but in the 
“grand conception”:  an increasingly proprietary copyright law that 
overwhelmingly equates the public interest with the private interests 
of copyright owners.  Those private interests, in turn, largely are held 
by the very companies that control the market for copyrightable 
works.  Is it any coincidence that the new economics of copyright 
places so much emphasis on private ordering,47 in which the govern-
ment plays no significant part? 
45 L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, 
at 249, 249; see also Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 365 
(2002) (“Whether to impose a complicated legal regime on individual consumer con-
sumption of copyrighted works is a crucial question on which reasonable people might 
differ violently.  Resolving it requires us to decide what we have a copyright law for.”).
46 Leval, supra note 43, at 1110.  In proposing that fair use assessments depend 
“primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative,” id. at 
1111, Judge Leval has argued that fair use should not be seen as merely an occasional 
exception to the copyright monopoly, id. at 1110.  Yet this is precisely what fair use has 
become, in part because of courts’ emphasis on transformation itself.
47 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 492 (1998) (“Market ordering presupposes some 
ex ante distribution of entitlements.  The cybereconomists take existing entitlements 
as given, and do not inquire as to the welfare effects of alternative entitlement struc-
tures.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Professor Julie Cohen has argued that “we need a theory of the 
ordinary user:  a theory of what conduct is private.”48  To date, how-
ever, such a theory has been elusive.  Because the law described by any 
such theory must “promote the Progress of Science,”49 I begin, in Part 
I, by locating and examining a few of the strands of the public interest 
in copyright—the inducement of creation, access to the products of 
creation, and the promotion of open and populous markets in copy-
righted expression.  In Part II, I describe a copyright law that would 
serve these interests by identifying and punishing methods of unfair 
competition in the relevant markets.  Because, in this Article, I focus 
on the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution (but not adap-
tation, performance, or display), I define the relevant markets to in-
clude only the markets for copies of copyrighted works.  In these mar-
kets, I argue, acts of copying are not “unfair,” in themselves, because 
they do not inflict significant competitive harms.  Accordingly, I argue 
that copyright owners should not enjoy the exclusive right of repro-
duction (which implicates private conduct), but should enjoy only the 
exclusive right to distribute copies of their works to the public.  In 
Part III, I reveal how such a copyright law might help to resolve a few 
of the issues at the very center of the debate:  the pervasiveness of per-
sonal copying; the rise of contractual and technological access con-
trols; and, of course, the “death”50 of the fair use defense.  I also exam-
ine how such a law might affect the Google case. 
I.  LOCATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN COPYRIGHT 
Among copyright scholars, a debate of sorts is raging as to 
whether copyrights were or are “property,” and as to what the answer 
might mean for copyright law.51  While these are interesting questions, 
48 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright’s Public-Private Distinction, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 
967 (2005). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
50 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
51 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies:  Of Piracy, Proper-
tization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1008 (2006) (“American legal 
minds in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were using ‘literary,’ ‘artis-
tic,’ and ‘intellectual’ virtually interchangeably to refer to a kind of ‘property’ in ex-
pressive works.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895 (1997) (book review) (“[O]nly recently has the term ‘intellectual 
property’ come into vogue.”); see also L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair 
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 60 (1987) (“The Constitution creates no property rights.”). 
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they might not be very useful ones.  Contrary to what Blackstone fa-
mously wrote,52 to describe something as “property” is not to say that 
one has unlimited rights in it.  Property rights are subject to limits, 
which the government imposes in furtherance of the public welfare.  
As a consequence, it might not matter very much whether copyrights 
are “property” or are, instead, limited grants made for limited times, 
effected through enactments of positive law “according to the will and 
convenience of the society.”53  If the ownership of property is charac-
terized by the right to exclude others, then copyrights do indeed cre-
ate property rights.  But copyright law also regulates; in granting 
rights, it describes the range of acceptable behaviors among those hav-
ing an interest in copyrighted works—that is, creators, publishers, us-
ers, consumers, and the public.  When Professor Patterson wrote that 
copyright has “both a proprietary and a regulatory basis,”54 he was 
right, although not, perhaps, in the way he intended.  Property and 
regulation are two sides of the same coin:  to the extent the law cre-
ates property rights in creators and their assigns, it regulates the be-
havior of the rest of us. 
The most useful observation about copyrights as property might 
be that characterizing copyrights as “property” risks conveying the im-
pression that copyrights are more exclusive than they really are.  The 
word “property” connotes a broad right—that is, a right with few, if 
any, exceptions.  It also connotes a durable right.  At a fundamental 
level, the question whether copyrights are property revolves around 
the extent to which the government can and should tinker with the 
exclusive rights that copyright owners have come to enjoy.  Most 
would agree that the government has the power to do this.  For the 
most part, however, scholars have elided the question of what interests 
the government should consider when it decides whether and how to 
exercise this power.55  Obviously, the government should seek to “pro-
52 According to Blackstone, “[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the 
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other.”  WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *1-2. 
53 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS 1286, 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
54 Patterson, supra note 51, at 32. 
55 But see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L.J. 283, 289 (1996) (suggesting that “our fundamental, nonmonetizable interests in 
expressive diversity and informed citizenship” should underlie copyright law). 
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mote the Progress of Science,”56 but this injunction is so vague as to be 
almost completely unhelpful.  What, exactly, are the interests underly-
ing copyright law? 
The law itself is ambivalent on the subject.  Consider the fair use 
defense:  the fact that a use can be prima facie infringing and none-
theless be “fair” suggests that the government does have the power to 
shrink the property right.  Courts exercise this power to safeguard the 
public interest in cases in which upholding the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner would undermine the purposes of copyright law.57  
Does the public interest lie in providing copyright owners with exclu-
sive rights that may be invaded only when the First Amendment re-
quires it?  Or, in codifying the fair use defense, did Congress delegate 
to courts the authority to grant the public access to copyrighted works 
when the public benefit outweighs the private harm to the copyright 
holder?  Courts have not provided consistent answers to these ques-
tions, and as a result, the constituencies of copyright are locked in a 
struggle to define “fair use” and thus to determine the meaning of 
copyright itself.  At the heart of this struggle is the definition of the 
“public interest.” 
In the balance of this Part, I locate and examine a few strands of 
the public interest in copyright:  (1) the inducement of creation 
through the grant of exclusive rights, (2) access to the products of 
creation, and (3) the promotion of open and populous markets in 
copyrighted expression. 
A.  The Inducement of Creation 
In pursuing private interests, private actors sometimes engage in 
behaviors that threaten the public interest.  The government responds 
by seeking to modify those behaviors, whether legislatively (by enact-
ing statutes) or administratively (by rulemaking and enforcement).  
Indeed, copyright law itself is a response to behavior that threatens 
the public interest:  because copyrightable works may be copied and 
distributed without consuming the original, creators who released 
their work to the public without the protection of copyright law soon 
would find themselves competing with others for sales of copies of 
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
57 See Leval, supra note 43, at 1110-11 (“The [statutory] factors . . . . direct courts to 
examine the issue from every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and 
how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the objectives of the copy-
right.”). 
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their own works.  Unable, as a result, to recoup the costs of their la-
bors, creators might reduce their investments in creation, thus leading 
to the creation of fewer copyrightable works.  To prevent this harm, 
Congress has acted legislatively under its constitutional power to “se-
cur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings.”58  In granting exclusive rights to creators, the Copy-
right Act has aimed to promote the public interest by promoting “the 
encouragement of learning”59 through the inducement of creation—a 
goal that surely is consistent with the constitutional invocation to 
“promote the Progress of Science.”60
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of exclusive rights to creators 
is widely thought to promote the public good.  As courts are fond of 
reminding litigants, James Madison wrote in 1788 that “[t]he public 
good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals” in the copy-
right context.61  But this statement is only partly correct.  To be sure, 
the enterprise of creation depends on granting creators the right to 
prevent others from making at least some uses of their works, and ac-
cordingly, the public good flows from granting at least some individual 
claims in works of authorship.  But as Madison likely would acknowl-
edge today, the public good does not always or only reside in the 
grant of exclusive rights.62  The phrase “encouragement of learning” 
itself suggests as much:  if the enterprise of learning depends upon 
the creation of copyrightable works, it also depends on the quality and 
diversity of those works, as well as on their proliferation and distribu-
tion throughout society.  It may even depend on their proliferation 
and distribution in the form of tangible copies.  It certainly depends 
on giving the public the opportunity to respond to those works in 
sundry ways.  And none of these things is possible without allowing the 
public at least some unauthorized access to copyrighted works. 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
59 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  By “‘Science’ . . . the Framers meant learning or 
knowledge.”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:  
A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002)).
61 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see 
also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18 (quoting the same line from THE FEDERALIST NO. 43). 
62 See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 629 
(2006) (discussing how at the founding of the United States, Madison understood “the 
benefits of a limited term of copyright, both as a means of promoting utility (i.e., en-
couraging creation) and as a means of rewarding authors for their labors”). 
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B.  Access to the Products of Creation 
In determining whether a defendant has engaged in copyright in-
fringement, courts first establish whether the defendant copied a 
copyrighted work; in the absence of any direct evidence of copying, 
courts ask whether the defendant had “access” to the original.63  This 
stands to reason, for it would be impossible to copy a work without 
having seen it (or, in the case of music, having heard it).  For this 
purpose, courts have defined “access” as the “reasonable opportunity” 
to view (or hear) a copyrighted work.64  One can imagine having per-
fectly legal access to that work, as if, for example, one were to buy a 
copy of a copyrighted novel.  But buying a copy of a novel does not 
give the buyer the right to use the copyrighted work “fixed” in that 
copy—that is, the creative expression itself—however she wishes.  As 
section 202 of the Copyright Act provides, “[o]wnership of a copy-
right . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied.”65  The copy is one thing; the expression is quite 
another.  Thus, for most purposes, the word “access” indicates an in-
teraction between a human being and the expression contained 
within a copy of a copyrighted work. 
Obviously, copyright owners want human beings to interact with 
their expression, but they also want to control the terms of such inter-
actions.  About one hundred years ago, in testifying before Congress, 
Arthur Steuart, Chairman of the Copyright Committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, talked of binding the reading public by a contract 
placed on the first page of a book, “prohibiting [them] from doing 
anything with [the] book except reading it themselves.”66  Authors  
63 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (stating that “‘indirect evidence’” of copying can include showing that the 
defendant had “‘access to the copyrighted work’” (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Group, 
Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992))). 
64 Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (cit-
ing, inter alia, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 
1983) (noting that access could have been found “because of the wide dissemination 
of [the song “He’s So Fine”],” the copyrighted work at issue, during the period in ques-
tion)). 
65 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
66 Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the S. and H. Comms. on Patents, 59th 
Cong. 164 (1906) (statement of Arthur Steuart, Chairman, ABA Copyright Comm.).  
Steuart was quite clear in his responses to his congressional questioners: 
Mr. Walker.  According to this bill as you understand it, would it be compe-
tent for an author to print under his copyright notice a reservation prohibit-
ing people from doing anything with that book except reading it themselves?  
Would it be competent for the author to prohibit the sale of that book by the 
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and publishers want the same thing today:  they want people to buy 
and read copies of their books, but they do not want people to share 
those books, or worse, to engage in any further interaction with the 
expression inside.  To quote Professor Yochai Benkler, authors and 
publishers want people to be “consumers” of copyrighted expres-
sion—not “users” of it.67
To a significant extent, copyright law gives authors and publishers 
what they want.  Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives a copyright 
owner “the exclusive rights . . . (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work 
in copies . . . ; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work; [and] (3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted 
work to the public.”68  An owner of copyright in a qualifying type of 
work (including books) also receives “the exclusive rights . . . (4) . . . 
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and] (5) . . . to display the 
copyrighted work publicly.”69  Any such access to a copyrighted work 
must be bought and paid for—or, in the alternative, may be had only 
after the expiration of the copyright.  As the Supreme Court has in-
structed, “copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the 
general public through [unauthorized] access to creative works.”70  
The public benefits from such access, however, only “after the  
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”71  For the du- 
purchaser? 
Mr. Steuart.  Yes, sir. . . . [U]nder the absolute right of the author, he could 
make any reservation he pleased.  In other words, this so-called sale would be 
nothing but a license to read. 
Mr. Mckinney.  May I ask a question, Mr. Steuart?  Was it the object of the 
draftsmen of this bill to break up the second-hand book business? 
Mr. Steuart.  Not at all. 
Id. 
67 As Professor Benkler explained, “[u]sers are individuals who are sometimes 
consumers, sometimes producers, and who are substantially more engaged partici-
pants, both in defining the terms of their productive activity and in defining what they 
consume and how they consume it.”  Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons:  Towards 
a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1268 (2003). 
68 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000).  In this Article, I focus on the first and third sec-
tion 106 rights.     
69 Id. § 106(4)-(5).  The final subsection provides a copyright owner with “the ex-
clusive right[] . . . (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”  Id. § 106(6).  
70 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (emphasis added).
71 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (em-
phasis added); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“[U]ltimate public access is the overriding purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion.”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (holding that in “balanc[ing] . . . 
the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and 
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ration of the copyright term, copyright owners have the right to re-
quire payment in return for access, or even to refuse access to the 
work altogether.72  Indeed, courts have a word for unauthorized access 
to a work during its copyright term:  “infringement.”73
So far as courts are concerned, construing access as “access, even-
tually” is the easiest way in which to “enrich[] the general public 
through access”74 while promoting “the encouragement of learning.”75  
On the one hand, copyright law is supposed to induce creation (and 
therefore encourage learning) by giving copyright owners the right to 
exclude the public from interacting with their works in statutorily 
prohibited ways.  On the other hand, copyright law is supposed to 
grant the public the opportunity to interact with copyrightable works.  
While these purposes may not “oppose each other with exactly equal 
force,”76 as Professor Glynn Lunney has argued, they are at least partly 
contradictory.  Courts have responded to this “paradox” by placing a 
finger on the scale, “implicitly presuming that more incentives are de-
sirable in the absence of some unusual need for access”77 during the 
copyright term.  In other words, in the tug of war between induce-
ment and unauthorized access, inducement almost always wins.78
the public’s need for access to creative works . . . [t]he copyright term is limited so that 
the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist’s labors.”).
72 See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29 (“[N]othing in the copyright statutes would pre-
vent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”).
73 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) 
(“Any copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to 
the copyrighted work.”).
74 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.
75 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124. 
76 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 483, 486 (1996). 
77 Id. at 487. 
78 There are exceptions to this rule.  In Meeropol v. Nizer, the district court found 
that the distribution of a book about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg “‘serve[d] the public 
interest in the free dissemination of information,’” even though it contained portions 
of their copyrighted letters.  361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting Rose-
mont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (1966)).  Similarly, in 
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the district court refused to halt the publication of a 
book containing copies of frames of the Zapruder film, holding, in part, that “[t]here 
is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of Presi-
dent Kennedy.”  293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  As precedents, however, these 
cases are exceptionally weak.  Not only did they both arise from events of unusual his-
toric importance, but courts have questioned whether they were rightly decided, even 
on their unusual facts.  See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 
576, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The district court [in Bernard Geis] . . . may not have 
properly evaluated the potential economic harm to the owner of the copyright in 
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If providing the public with unauthorized access to copyrighted 
works is, like fair use, a “bizarre . . . departure”79 from the preference 
for more incentives (which is to say, more rights), then one cannot 
help but feel that the courts are missing something very important 
about access:  access is not something that inherently must be with-
held entirely from the public until the end of the copyright term.  Ac-
cess, very much like property itself, is not absolute; it is qualified.  That 
is, unauthorized access to some of a copyrighted work can be granted 
to some of the public for some purposes without sacrificing the public 
interest in inducing creation.  The limited nature of the grant of 
rights in section 1 of the Copyright Act of 1909 supports this notion.80  
More recent examples include sections 107 through 122 of the Copy-
right Act of 1976, as amended, in which Congress has enacted pages 
of limitations on the broad rights enumerated in section 106.81  For 
the most part, Congress has defined those limitations very narrowly, 
but it need not have done so.  Instead, Congress could have provided 
creators with fewer rights, thus providing the public with increased ac-
cess to the fruits of creation.82  Congress also could have asked 
whether there might be other strands of the public interest in copy-
granting summary judgment to the defendants.” (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR 
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 98-100 (1985))); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. 
Supp. 483, 489 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“To the extent [Bernard Geis] rests upon the idea that 
copyright must yield where ‘there is a public interest in having the fullest information 
available in [sic] the murder of President Kennedy’, it is probably inconsistent with 
[Harper & Row].” (quoting Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. at 146)).
 One other case bears mentioning.  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., the Supreme Court cited a finding by the district court that copying television pro-
grams for later viewing “served the public interest in increasing access to television 
programming.”  464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984).  According to the district court, that interest 
was “consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access 
to information through the public airwaves.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Ultimately siding with the district court in its holding, id. at 456, the Supreme Court 
seemed convinced by this analysis.  As Professor Jessica Litman has chronicled, how-
ever, Sony was an exceptional case in every way.  See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 929-30 (2005) (discussing how the Justices reacted to the 
first oral argument of Sony before the Supreme Court). 
79 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
80 See Ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (listing the particular rights enjoyed by 
owners of copyright in particular types of works).
81 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000).
82 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1815 
(2000) (“[T]hose who favor a system more closely resembling traditional copyright law 
need to explain why a regime of complete entitlements plus compulsory limitations is 
not functionally equivalent to a regime of incomplete entitlements.”).
  
2007] COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 917 
 
right, such as the existence of open and populous markets in copy-
righted expression. 
C.  Open and Populous Markets in Copyrighted Expression 
To date, Congress has not focused on the public benefit to be 
gained by promoting competition in copyright “markets,” but it has 
described this value in general by enacting a host of other federal 
statutes.  These include the Sherman Act of 1890,83 the Clayton Act of 
1914,84 the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,85 the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,86 the Lanham Act of 1946,87 the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,88 and the Tele-
communications Act of 1996.89  To be sure, the foregoing statutes 
were not enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Con-
stitution,90 nor do they create rights in “original works of author-
ship.”91  They do, however, regulate the behavior of participants in the 
markets in which copies of copyrighted works are bought and sold.  As 
a consequence, I believe these statutes to be instructive, not only with 
respect to how Congress has served the interests of creators, publish-
ers, users, consumers, and the public in general, but also with respect 
to how Congress has described those interests.92  Those descriptions 
converge to a surprising degree. 
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
companies from monopolizing trade or from entering into any “con-
tract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or [inter-
83 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
84 Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730. 
85 Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717. 
86 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064. 
87 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427. 
88 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
89 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
90 Cf. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (holding that Congress did 
not have the authority to promulgate trademark legislation pursuant to that clause). 
91 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
92 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (2000) (“[I]ntellectual property law is part of a larger 
framework that includes other public and private law, including, particularly, anti-
trust.”). 
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state] commerce.”93  Congress expanded its reach in the Clayton Act 
of 1914, which proscribes specific acts, such as mergers and acquisi-
tions, that either “substantially lessen competition” or “create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce.”94  In 1914, Congress also created the 
Federal Trade Commission to investigate and prosecute “unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce”95—that is, acts “which if left un-
touched would probably create the evils prohibited by the 
Sherman . . . Act.”96  While scholars disagree as to the legislative intent 
behind these enactments,97 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has sug-
gested that, “consistent with nineteenth century American ideology 
generally, . . . the antitrust laws were passed out of a pervasive fear of 
private ‘bigness’ and the political power that it engendered.”98
“[P]rivate ‘bigness’” also can lead to market power:  large compa-
nies (and combinations of companies) have greater resources than 
their competitors, thus giving them the ability to price their goods be-
low the cost of production—at least for a time.99  Competitors who do 
not have the resources to lower their own prices soon find themselves 
with reduced shares of the market.  As the large companies gain mar-
ket share by squeezing out competitors, they also gain the ability to re-
turn prices to higher levels.  Consumers, who are forced to pay those 
higher prices, experience a reduction in what economists term “con-
sumer’s surplus.”100  Consumers also lose the opportunity to purchase 
93 Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209.
94 Ch. 323, §§ 2, 3, 7, 38 Stat. 730, 730-32; see also Dictograph Prods. v. FTC, 217 
F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1954) (“Congress, in passing the Clayton Act, sought to bring 
within the scope of its proscriptive provisions, conduct and practices which though 
dangerous to the competitive structure, were not covered at all or only inadequately 
covered by the provisions of the Sherman Act.”).
95 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, §§ 1, 5, 38 Stat. 717, 717, 719-
21. 
96 Butterick Publ’g Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1936) (citing FTC v. 
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); FTC v. Sinclair Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923)).
97 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION  
AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.1a, at 47-51 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the historical background 
of antitrust regulation under the Sherman Act). 
98 Id. § 2.1a, at 50-51. 
99 This practice is known as “predatory pricing.”  See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1986) (“Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing 
below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in 
the short run and reducing competition in the long run.  It is a practice that harms 
both competitors and competition.”).
100 See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 79 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d 
ed. 1986) (defining “consumer’s surplus” as “a measure of the benefit to a consumer, 
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products from those companies that never enter the market because 
of predatory pricing or other barriers to entry.  Congress has enacted 
the antitrust laws in order to “protect the public against [these] evils 
commonly incident to monopolies”:101  higher prices, products or ser-
vices of lesser quality, and fewer choices as a result of competitors exit-
ing the market.102  As the Ninth Circuit put it, “[w]hen a producer is 
shielded from competition, he is likely to provide lesser service at a 
higher price; the victim is the consumer who gets a raw deal.  This is 
the evil the antitrust laws are meant to avert.”103
In addition to addressing “bigness,” Congress also has expressed 
its concerns about “concentration,” or the tendency of an industry to 
consolidate through mergers, acquisitions, and other such transac-
tions.104  In 1890, Senator Sherman himself indicated that, in propos-
ing legislation, he was motivated by a “desire to put an end to great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual 
before them.”105  And in 1950, Congress amended section 7 of the 
Clayton Act because it “fear[ed] . . . what was considered to be a rising 
tide of economic concentration in the American economy.”106  Con-
gress did not target industry concentration simply because concentra-
tion leads to higher prices, although this concern would have been 
net of the sacrifice he has to make, from being able to buy a commodity at a particular 
price”). 
101 United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (explaining the 
purpose of the Sherman Act).
102 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act . . . 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality 
and the greatest material progress . . . .”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 
493 (1940) (noting that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent “restraint to free 
competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict produc-
tion, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or 
consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special 
form of public injury”); Beal Corp. Liquidating Trust v. Valleylab, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 
1350, 1367 (D. Colo. 1996) (“The federal antitrust laws seek to prevent manufacturers 
and sellers of products from exiting the market.”).
103 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
104 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 
1979) (noting that section 2 of the Sherman Act is designed to prevent “a pernicious 
market structure in which the concentration of power saps the salubrious influence of 
competition”).
105 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
106 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); see also Monfort of 
Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 576 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that “Congress 
intended section 7 of the Clayton Act to prevent” industry concentration, which likely 
results in “substantially lessened [competition] because of tacit collusion”).
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sufficient justification for congressional action.  Congress also wished 
to “perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, 
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively com-
pete with each other.”107  Such competition yields a host of benefits 
including product diversity, which is particularly important when the 
“product” is information.108  As the Supreme Court famously wrote in 
Associated Press v. United States, “the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public.”109
As the foregoing discussion should make clear, the antitrust laws 
target public evils, not private ones.  Accordingly, the antitrust laws ex-
ist not to “protect deserving private persons, but to vindicate the pub-
lic interest,”110 which the case law describes as “paramount.”111  Courts 
have described the nature of that interest in several ways.  First and 
foremost, the consuming public has an interest in the existence of 
“fair price competition in an open market”112 characterized by that 
particularly American value, “equality of opportunity.”113  Second, the 
107 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
108 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market . . . .”); 
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 (D.D.C. 1987) (“‘[I]n promoting 
diversity in sources of information, the values underlying the First Amendment coin-
cide with the policy of the antitrust laws.’” (quoting United States v. AT&T, 552 F. 
Supp. 131, 184 (D.D.C. 1982))); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 
(1958) (observing that Congress enacted the Sherman Act to create an environment 
“conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions”).
109 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (observing that the media serve “one of the most vital of all gen-
eral interests:  the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as 
many different facets and colors as is possible”), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
110 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1972) (cit-
ing N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4; D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 
165, 174 (1915)).
111 Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 975 (D. Or. 1939) 
(citing Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930)).
112 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979).
113 See William Goldman Theatres v. Loew’s, Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3d Cir. 1945) 
(“The purpose of the anti-trust laws [was] an intendment to secure equality of oppor-
tunity . . . .”); Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co. v. Ind. Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co., 88 F.2d 979, 
982 (7th Cir. 1937) (“Clearly, the purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to secure 
equality of opportunity . . . .” (citing Paramount, 282 U.S. at 42)); El Aguila Food Prods. 
Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 627 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (characterizing “an 
equal opportunity to engage in business, trade, and commerce” as “the primary feature 
of the private free enterprise system” that antitrust laws seek to safeguard).
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public interest lies in the existence of a populous market in which 
“small units,” including individuals, can have an impact.114  These 
market structures, in turn, are likely to facilitate public access to a di-
versity of products.
These conceptions of the public interest are not unique to the an-
titrust laws.  In regulating the communications industries, Congress 
repeatedly has stated its wish to open markets to increased competi-
tion.  In some cases, these statements may seem hypocritical; as Pro-
fessor Timothy Wu has observed, Congress supported the oligopolistic 
broadcast industry in the industry’s fight to exclude cable companies 
from the market.115  On the whole, however, there are plenty of indi-
cations that Congress does believe in the benefits flowing from com-
petitive markets, including lower prices, higher quality, and diversity 
of expression.  As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, for ex-
ample, Congress required telecommunications carriers to provide 
competing local telephone companies with “nondiscriminatory ac-
cess” to networks and equipment.116  Similarly, in the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Congress sought 
to reverse the effects of industry concentration117 by requiring cable 
companies to dedicate some of their television channels to local and 
nonprofit broadcast stations,118 which Congress viewed as “critical to 
an informed electorate.”119  In holding these “must-carry” provisions 
constitutional, the Supreme Court identified several “important gov-
ernmental interests” that the provisions aimed to serve, including 
“‘promoting fair competition in the market for television program-
ming’” and “‘promoting the widespread dissemination of information 
from a multiplicity of sources.’”120
114 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
115 Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 311-24 
(2004) (chronicling the conflict between the broadcast and cable television industries 
and Congress’s role in it). 
116 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56, 62 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 251(b)(3), (c)(3) (2000)). 
117 See Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(4), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 (“The cable industry 
has become highly concentrated.  The potential effects of such concentration are bar-
riers to entry for new programmers and a reduction in the number of media voices 
available to consumers.”). 
118 Id. §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1471-81. 
119 Id. § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1461. 
120 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
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To date, copyright law has not embraced these goals, or at least 
has not done so expressly.  One reason, perhaps, is that copyrights are 
meant to be solutions to the problem of competition;121 they are legal 
monopolies122 under which copyright owners enjoy the right to ex-
clude competitors from using their works in various ways.  If they 
choose to exercise that right, copyright owners can market fewer cop-
ies of their works to fewer consumers at higher prices.  “Thus,” as the 
First Circuit pointed out, “at least in a particular market and for a par-
ticular period of time, the Copyright Act tolerates behavior that may 
harm both consumers and competitors.”123  This produces what seems 
to be a direct conflict between copyright law and the antitrust laws:  
copyright law gives copyright owners the right to inhibit competition, 
but “[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate 
the antitrust laws.”124  Courts are left to balance the two statutory 
schemes, producing inconsistent results.125
Copyright scholars have sought to minimize this conflict by tinker-
ing with how they define the “relevant market” for antitrust purposes.  
Instead of defining a product market to include, for example, a par-
ticular book or books by a particular author, scholars might broaden 
the definition to include books of a particular type.  If, as Professor 
Christopher Yoo has argued, “substitutes are readily available for most 
works,”126 then copyrights do not create market power at all:  competi-
tors can create or purchase their own copyrighted works, or use works 
in the public domain.  To quote Professor Richard Epstein, “[n]o one 
has to use any particular song or story for a particular project, but can 
draw on a rich culture, including items that have fallen out of copy-
121 See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:  The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property 
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 170 (1999) (“Intellectual property is a deliberate, gov-
ernment-sponsored departure from the principles of free competition, designed to 
subsidize creators and therefore to induce more creation.”). 
122 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 
(2003) (discussing the “copyright monopoly”). 
123 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184-85 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
124 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see 
also Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1185 (“Although creation and protection of original works of 
authorship may be a national pastime, the Sherman Act does not explicitly exempt 
such activity from antitrust scrutiny . . . .”).
125 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 13.09[A][2][a], at 13-295 to -296 (discussing the 
range of conflicting approaches that courts have taken to balancing antitrust and copy-
right principles). 
126 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 
218 (2004). 
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right protection.”127  As for consumers, if they lack the resources to 
buy a novel about Harry Potter, they can buy a novel about Oliver 
Twist instead. 
As the foregoing example suggests, there may be problems with 
this approach.  While some works may readily be substituted for oth-
ers, some (like Harry Potter novels) almost certainly may not.  Other 
examples abound.  Moreover, even if Professor Yoo is correct, it does 
not follow, as Professor Epstein has concluded, that potential uses lost 
to the copyright monopoly are “of little consequence for any dynamic 
development of the arts.”128  The reason lies in the structure of those 
industries in which market participants are most likely to hold copy-
rights.  As Professor Benkler has explained, “strong” copyrights are 
especially beneficial “to organizations that own large inventories of ex-
isting information and cultural goods.”129  In addition to marketing 
existing works, such organizations can adapt existing works into new 
ones, thus integrating the creation function with the inventory man-
agement and marketing functions.130  Using the returns from this ver-
tical integration, they also can acquire other organizations, increasing 
the number of copyrighted works in their inventories.  Competitors 
who lack inventories of their own thus find themselves increasingly 
marginalized.131  Not only does this arms race lead to industry concen-
tration through acquisitions, but it also perpetuates itself by creating 
“incentives systematically to misapply human capital to information 
resources” in the foregoing ways.132  In addition, it subjects consumers 
to rising prices, diminishing supply, and a wearying homogeneity of 
127 Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?  Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright 
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 23 (2005). 
128 Id. 
129 Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass:  Alice and the Constitutional Founda-
tions of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 181.
130 See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Produc-
tion, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 83 (2002) (“[I]ncreased protection benefits com-
mercial information producers that vertically integrate new production with manage-
ment of large-scale owned inventories of existing information . . . .”).
131 See Wu, supra note 115, at 329 (discussing how vertical integration threatens 
innovation); see also Cohen, supra note 82, at 1811 (“An imbalance may result if a par-
ticular content provider has a dominant market share, or a unique and nonsubsti-
tutable work.”).
132 Benkler, supra note 130, at 83; see also id. at 93 (positing that “inventory owners 
will systematically misallocate human creativity to reworking owned-inventory rather 
than to utilizing the best information inputs available to produce the best new infor-
mation product”).
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expression.133  If Disney is not “repackaging Mickey Mouse car-
toons,”134 it is buying Winnie the Pooh and making deals with Pixar, 
and in the end, everything looks the same.135  Thus, if copyright law is 
not opposed to open and populous markets per se, it is not particu-
larly productive of them, either. 
Lawmakers appear to have assumed that the public must tolerate 
these evils in order to induce creation, which is thought to be more 
important than promoting competition.  In fact, however, the conflict 
between these values is overstated.  Like copyright law, antitrust and 
communications laws recognize that some return on investment, in-
cluding the grant of property rights, is necessary to induce invest-
ments of capital and labor in the first place.  Yet the existence of those 
rights does not prevent the government from regulating the behavior 
of those who enjoy them.  Congress has not hesitated to place limits 
on property rights in order to protect the public interest—requiring 
telephone companies, for example, to provide their competitors with 
access to lines and switches so that consumers could enjoy the benefits 
of price competition in the market for local and long distance ser-
133 See id. at 93 (“The differential effects of increases in intellectual property pro-
tection on divergent strategies suggest that such increases lead to commercialization, 
concentration, and homogenization of information production.” (footnote omitted)); 
see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture:  Locating the Public Do-
main, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 142 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (“[T]he greater cultural standardization likely to occur under 
conditions of pervasive commodification is cause for substantial concern.” (citing 
Benkler, supra note 130, at 81-99)). 
 As Professor Lunney has put it, “[s]eeking the common denominator among a 
wider audience leads almost inevitably to a lower common denominator.  As a result, 
striving for popularity may produce not a wonderful, cacophonous variety, but a dull-
ing, repetitive sameness as works include over and over the same elements intended to 
cater to popular tastes.”  Lunney, supra note 5, at 888-89; see also Netanel, supra note 55, 
at 360 (“[G]iven market dictates and institutional risk-averseness, media conglomer-
ates share, at least to some extent, corporate patrons’ proclivities toward prosaic and 
safe products.”).  This cloud may have a silver lining.  As Professor William Fisher has 
speculated, “[t]he less attractive the menu of material ‘on the air,’ the more time peo-
ple would probably spend in more active leisure activities.”  William W. Fisher III, Re-
constructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1778 (1988). 
134 Benkler, supra note 130, at 83. 
135 Worse, perhaps, “increased prevalence of Mickeys should lead to increased in-
vestment in forming preferences for their products.  This should increase relative de-
mand for their products.  Repackaging the Mouse becomes not only cost effective, but 
also responsive to demand.”  Id. at 97-98; see also Netanel, supra note 55, at 352 (“The 
public communication of fixed original expression will support a democratic civil soci-
ety only if such expression is autonomous and diverse.”). 
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vice.136  Yes, the regulated companies enjoy property rights in their in-
frastructure, but as the Supreme Court wrote in a case brought under 
the Sherman Act, “rights . . . may be pushed to evil consequences, and 
therefore restrained” by law.137
Copyright law operates under the same principles, for rights in 
copyrightable works are also perfectly capable of being “pushed to evil 
consequences.”  Imagine, for example, how it would affect competi-
tion in the publishing industry if J.K. Rowling could prevent other 
novelists from writing about boy wizards who engage in epic struggles 
with dark lords.  The Copyright Act prevents this competitive harm by 
providing, in section 102(b), that “[i]n no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery.”138  In extending protection to creative expressions of ideas but 
not to the ideas themselves, “Congress balanced the competing con-
cerns of providing incentive to authors to create and of fostering 
competition in such creativity.”139  There are other ways in which copy-
right law has fostered competition:  the mechanical license is an an-
cient example;140 the defense of “copyright misuse” is a recent  
136 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 56, 
62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3), (c)(3) (2000)). 
137 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit similarly explained: 
[Microsoft] claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual 
property as it wishes:  “[I]f intellectual property rights have been lawfully ac-
quired,” it says, then “their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust li-
ability.”  Appelant’s Opening Br. at 105.  That is no more correct than the 
proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot 
give rise to tort liability.  As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated:  “Intellectual 
property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.” 
253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
138 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
139 Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
140 As a part of the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress narrowed the performance 
right in musical works by requiring songwriters to accept a compulsory royalty of two 
cents per mechanical reproduction (known as the “mechanical license”).  Ch. 320, 
§ 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Royalty Rates:  
Section 115, the Mechanical License, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (listing the updated royalty rates from 1909 through 2007).  
Congress believed this provision to be necessary to prevent the Aeolian Music Com-
pany from gaining a monopoly in the market for player piano rolls.  See H.R. REP. NO. 
60-2222, at 7-8 (1909). 
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one.141  But these examples are not evidence that Congress views the 
Copyright Act as an adjunct to the antitrust laws.142  In fact, the evi-
dence points the other way.  The oligopolistic structure of the copy-
right industries and their resistance to technological change are indi-
cations that Congress has given too much weight to inducement at the 
expense of providing access to both competitors and the public. 
In striking the balance at the heart of copyright law, Congress 
must begin by locating the several strands of the public interest.  First, 
the public interest is served by granting creators the right to prevent 
others from making at least some uses of their works, so as to provide 
those creators with the level of exclusivity necessary to induce crea-
tion.  Second, the public interest is served by granting the public the 
opportunity to interact with copyrightable works for at least some pur-
poses, even if copyright owners object to the terms of that interaction.  
And third, the public interest is served through “‘the widespread dis-
semination of information from a multiplicity of sources,’”143 which 
requires the government to promote at least some forms of competi-
tion in the markets for expression.  These strands need not contradict 
each other; they can, and should, be woven into a coherent fabric that 
“promote[s] the Progress of Science.”144  What is needed is a guide by 
which lawmakers and courts can mediate the seemingly conflicting 
demands of exclusive rights and unauthorized access, of legal mo-
nopolies145 and open markets, of inventory management and “expres-
141 The defense of copyright misuse is analagous to the patent misuse defense.  See 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (recognizing the de-
fense of patent misuse).  In the copyright context, the misuse defense “forbids the use 
of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the 
[Copyright] Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”  Lasercomb Am., 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (alterations in original); see id. at 
976 (“We are of the view . . . that since copyright and patent law serve parallel public 
interests, a ‘misuse’ defense should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate 
either right.”); Lemley, supra note 121, at 151-58 (discussing the doctrine and noting 
that it “is of relatively recent vintage”); infra note 281 and accompanying text. 
142 Cf. Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=923931 (suggesting 
that, though antitrust and intellectual property laws may share the goal of wealth 
maximization, “these two regimes pursue their shared goal through quite different 
means, one by fostering competition (antitrust) and one by curtailing it (intellectual 
property”)). 
143 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)). 
144 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
145 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 
(2003) (discussing the “copyright monopoly”). 
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sive diversity,”146 and of private reward and public benefit.  Fortu-
nately, that guide already exists; it is the law of unfair competition, 
and its spirit already resides at the heart of copyright law.147
II.  TOWARD A THEORY OF UNFAIR COMPETITION IN COPYRIGHT 
Professor Patterson once observed that “[t]he law of copyright can 
be viewed most usefully as statutory unfair competition” because the 
law “function[s] . . . to protect the copyrighted work against predatory 
competitive practices.”148  Copyright law does function in this way (al-
though it has other functions, too).  As we have seen, copyright law 
exists at least for the purpose of punishing acts that might diminish in-
centives to create—as if, for example, a creator were forced to stand 
by as others sold infringing copies of her works.  By proscribing such 
anticompetitive acts, copyright law serves one strand of the public in-
terest:  the inducement of creation.  Unfortunately, copyright law also 
proscribes a host of other acts that tend to promote competition.  The 
result is a statute that serves one aspect of the public interest while 
frustrating others.  It does so not only by restricting access to copy-
righted expression, but also by contributing to the concentration of 
markets in that expression. 
This Part proceeds as follows.  After describing the law of unfair 
competition, I compare it to the law of copyright, noting a few simi-
larities and differences between the two bodies of law.  The compari-
son is a complicated one, in part because copyright law does not speak 
of “competition” per se, and the law does not do a good job of defin-
ing “markets” in copyrighted works.  I begin by examining how law-
makers might decide which harms constitute competitive harms in 
which relevant markets.  By using those definitions, and by identifying 
the competitive harms in the markets for copies of copyrighted works, I 
conclude that acts of reproduction, standing alone, do not constitute 
146 This phrase is associated with Professor Neil Netanel, who has written exten-
sively on the subject.  See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 55, at 289 (arguing that neoclassical 
economists have “import[ed into copyright] a theory of property that fails adequately 
to account for our fundamental, nonmonetizable interests in expressive diversity and 
informed citizenship”). 
147 It also resides at the heart of patent law.  See United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof 
Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945) (“The general objectives of the Patent 
Laws and the Anti-Trust Laws are the same.  Both are intended to prevent unfair com-
petition.”).
148 Patterson, supra note 51, at 6. 
  
928 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 899 
 
the sorts of “predatory competitive practices”149 that copyright law 
should seek to remedy.  Accordingly, I argue that copyright owners 
should not enjoy the reproduction right, but instead should enjoy only 
the exclusive right of public distribution.  I conclude by examining 
the contours of that right. 
A.  Of Copyright and Public Acts 
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the belief that, on 
the whole, competition is good; that is, “[t]he freedom to . . . compete 
for the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise 
of the free enterprise system.”150  Sometimes, of course, this competi-
tion causes harm in the form of “divert[ed] business,”151 but the law 
concerns itself with that harm only when competitors use “particular 
methods of competition determined to be unfair.”152  Among those 
methods is the tort of “passing off,” which occurs when “a producer 
misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.”153  The 
usual way in which a producer commits this wrong is by marking his 
goods with a trademark that confuses consumers as to the origin of 
the marked goods.154  By punishing this wrong, the law of unfair com-
petition (and in particular, trademark law) protects producers and 
consumers alike:  while the law exists to safeguard the investments of 
trademark owners by giving them exclusive rights,155 it also exists to 
149 Id. 
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27 n.1 (2003); 
see also William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1924) (holding 
that because “petitioner sought to avail itself of the favorable repute which had been 
established for respondent’s preparation in order to sell its own. . . . The charge of un-
fair competition [was] established”).
154 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“[T]he 
common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.”).  
Thus, “[t]he primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or 
ownership of the article to which it is affixed.”  Id. at 412.  When a producer has estab-
lished rights in such a mark, “others are debarred from applying the same mark to 
goods of the same description, because to do so would in effect represent their goods 
to be of his production and would tend to deprive him of the profit he might make 
through the sale of the goods.”  Id. 
155 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3),  available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=889162 (arguing that “trademark law traditionally was not intended primarily 
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serve the public interest in avoiding confusion.156  The latter principle, 
in turn, confines the scope of the trademark right.  Congress has codi-
fied these principles in the Lanham Act of 1946.157
Like the property right in copyrights, the property right in trade-
marks is limited.158  Under the Lanham Act, rights in trademarks flow 
from the use of those marks in interstate commerce to identify the 
source of the marked goods.  This trademark use is the prerequisite to 
protection because consumers cannot form the mental association be-
tween a trademark and the goods it identifies—known as “secondary 
meaning”—unless those goods are released into the stream of com-
merce.159  In the absence of such an association, another producer 
would be free to use the trademark to identify her own products be-
cause that use would not engender any confusion.  Thus, by condi-
tioning the property right on the use of trademarks in commerce, 
trademark law encourages producers to distribute goods bearing 
those marks to the public.160
to protect consumers” but “sought to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of 
their trade by competitors”). 
156 See Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1564 
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he public interest in preventing confusion around the market-
place is paramount . . . .”); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 
F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) (observing, in a trademark infringement action, that “[a] 
third party, the consuming public, is present and its interests are paramount”).
157 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n 
(2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1274-75 (stating that the Lanham Act concerns itself with “securing to the owner the 
good will of his business and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marked 
goods”).  The Lanham Act thus complements the Federal Trade Commission Act of 
1914, which empowers the Commission to bring enforcement actions against those 
“persons, partnerships, and corporations” engaging in “unfair methods of competition 
in commerce,” ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719. 
158 See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 413 (“Common-law trade-marks, and 
the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property rights; 
but . . . the right grows out of use, not mere adoption.” (citation omitted)). 
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining “trademark” and “use in commerce”).  
But see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 16:13 (4th ed. 2006) (describing cases in which courts “somewhat tentatively and 
cautiously” have held that “some form of pre-sales publicity or sales solicitation may 
suffice to prove priority over a rival user”). 
160 Copyright law used to impose a similar requirement known as publication, 
which occurs when a copyright owner makes her work “available to members of the 
public regardless of who they are or what they will do with it.”  Acad. of Motion Picture 
Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991); see 
also Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he word ‘publication’ is ‘a legal word of art, denoting a process much 
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Once a producer has established rights in a mark, she has the 
right to prevent others from marking their goods with symbols that 
are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of those goods.  
Courts determine whether such a likelihood of confusion exists by 
weighing several factors, including “the strength of [the] mark, the 
degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the 
products” in the marketplace, “the sophistication of the buyers,” and, 
of course, the existence of any “actual confusion.”161  Thus, for the 
purposes of infringement law, two producers can adopt and use the 
same trademark, so long as they use the mark on different goods, in 
different markets, or in different places.  And while courts ask 
whether the defendant acted in “good faith in adopting its own 
mark,”162 bad faith, standing alone, is not enough to support the im-
position of liability.  Instead, courts inquire into the existence of com-
petitive harm:  in making purchasing decisions, are consumers likely 
to be misled as to which product comes from which source, so as to 
deprive the trademark owner “of the profit he might make through 
the sale of the goods which the purchaser intended to buy”?163
Copyright law and the law of unfair competition (including 
trademark law) have a number of things in common.  First, both bod-
ies of law modify market outcomes by providing producers with lim-
ited property rights as against competitors, or those who would behave 
in ways that the law wishes to discourage.164  In trademark law, those 
competitors are likely to be producers themselves, while in copyright 
law, the word “competitor” includes users and consumers along with 
producers, each of whom enjoys the technological means by which to 
engage in anticompetitive acts.  Second, both bodies of law create 
property rights as inducements to investment in the production or use 
of intangibles that benefit the public.  As we have seen, copyrights 
benefit the public by “promot[ing] the Progress of Science”165 in sev-
eral important ways.  And while Congress does not wish to encourage 
more esoteric than is suggested by the lay definition of the term.’” (quoting Melville B. 
Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 185 (1956))). 
161 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
162 Id. 
163 Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412. 
164 One might argue that unlike copyright law, the law of unfair competition exists 
to facilitate market outcomes, but this argument begs the question:  what outcomes 
would the market produce, absent the intervention of law?  Both copyright law and the 
law of unfair competition modify the functioning of voluntary exchanges between buy-
ers and sellers. 
165 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the proliferation of trademarks per se, trademarks benefit the public 
by enabling consumers to distinguish between goods sold by rival pro-
ducers. 
While these similarities are significant, copyright law and the law 
of unfair competition also differ in several ways.  Among the most sig-
nificant of these is the degree to which the creation and invasion of 
the property right depends on whether parties engage in what one 
might describe as “public acts.”166  While there may be exceptions to 
this rule, copyright law tends to ascribe legal significance to private 
acts, while the law of unfair competition does not. 
Consider the creation of rights.  Under copyright law, if a pro-
ducer wishes to obtain rights, she must either create an “original 
work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”167 
or negotiate a transfer of copyright from somebody who has created 
one.168  Both of these acts can be conducted entirely in private, and 
indeed they often are.  Most of the time, the public has no idea that 
somebody, somewhere, has created or purchased or licensed a copy-
rightable work.  These covert (for want of a better word) events have a 
public impact only when a copyright owner decides to publish her 
work, by which time the property right already exists.  By contrast, un-
der trademark law, a producer wishing to obtain rights in a mark must 
engage in the “bona fide use of [that] mark in the ordinary course of 
trade.”169  Trade ordinarily is “overt,” whether on the wholesale or re-
tail level.  When producers have tried to obtain rights in marks before 
engaging in “commercial transactions,” courts have rejected those ef-
forts as “bad faith attempt[s] to reserve a mark.”170  The two bodies of 
166 The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “public” as, inter alia, “ex-
posed to general view,” “of or relating to business or community interests as opposed 
to private affairs,” and “accessible to or shared by all members of the community.”  
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/public (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2007).  I do not use “public” to indicate “public law.”  See id. (defining 
“public” as “of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation or 
state,” and “of or relating to a government”). 
167 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
168 See id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole 
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law . . . .”).  A producer also 
may obtain rights in a copyrightable work by being the “employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared” under the “works made for hire” doctrine.  Id. 
 § 201(b).
169 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).  In some circumstances, an intent to use can give rise 
to trademark rights.  Id. 
170 See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(holding that a single shipment of pants with a “secondary label attached to an older 
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law also diverge when it comes to the invasion of rights.  A person can 
infringe a copyright by engaging in an entirely private act, for section 
106 provides copyright owners with “the exclusive right[] . . . to re-
produce the copyrighted work in copies,” regardless of where that re-
production takes place.171  To be guilty of infringement under section 
32(1) of the Lanham Act, however, a person must use a confusingly 
similar mark “in commerce . . . in connection with the sale, offering 
for sale, distribution, or advertising of . . . goods.”172
Copyright law used to accord more significance to public acts than 
it does today.173  Until January 1, 1978, the effective date of the Copy-
right Act of 1976, creators obtained rights under the federal statute 
only when they engaged in the act of general publication, which hap-
pened when at least one member of the general public obtained at 
least one copy of the work without being restricted from further dis-
tributing it.174  In most cases, this meant that rights were created upon 
“publication in print.”175  In 1976, however, Congress revised the stat-
ute to provide for the creation of rights at the moment a work was 
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression”176—regardless of 
whether the work was published.  As I have noted elsewhere, “[t]his 
‘fundamental’177 change led to an explosion in the number of [copy-
rightable works], fixed works being far more numerous, by definition, 
than published works.”178  But it also meant that, for the first time, ex-
clusive rights could be created in private, giving the public no way of 
knowing whether, and when, those rights were being created.  
line of goods” was not sufficient to establish the use in commerce required for trade-
mark protection). 
171 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
172 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000); see also id. § 1125(a) (describing infringing acts 
with respect to unregistered marks). 
173 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 963-64 (“Copyright’s public-private distinction used 
to be clearly stated on the surface of the law and transparently visible in the law’s op-
eration. . . . [but i]ncreasingly, for users, it seems that the law no longer recognizes 
conduct in private.”). 
174 See supra note 160 (describing the publication requirement). 
175 Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644). 
176 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45  
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)). 
177 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 859 (1987) (“[T]he new statute makes a number of fundamental changes in 
the American copyright system, including some so profound that they may mark a shift 
in direction for the very philosophy of copyright itself.” (quoting Barbara Ringer, First 
Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1977))). 
178 Stadler, supra note 62, at 641. 
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Changes to the law have also enabled courts to punish private viola-
tions of those rights.  Before July 8, 1870, when Congress added the 
word “copying” to the list of exclusive rights in the statute,179 copyright 
owners enjoyed only the exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, pub-
lishing, and vending” their works.180  Because those rights related to 
publication in print, the exercise of those rights tended to involve pub-
lic acts.  Today, by contrast, section 106 of the Copyright Act provides 
copyright owners with the exclusive right of reproduction, which—
unlike the exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing and 
vending”—is violated whenever the work is “fixed” in a “material ob-
ject[]” (such as the memory devices of a home computer).181  The in-
vasion of rights under copyright law, like the creation of those rights, 
is now, in many cases, a private act. 
In extending the reach of copyright into the world of private acts, 
lawmakers have broadened the property right, thus promoting the in-
ducement of creation at the expense of other strands of the public in-
terest.  Conceiving of copyright as a form of “statutory unfair competi-
tion”182 would solve this problem, at least in part, because it would 
focus the inquiry on the marketplace, which is a uniquely public (i.e., 
overt) institution.  Before we can begin this inquiry, however, we must 
learn to speak the language of competition. 
B.  The Language of Competition 
If lawmakers wished to punish only those invasions of the property 
right that threaten to cause competitive harm in the relevant markets 
in copyrighted works, they would have to begin by defining a few 
terms, including, of course, “competitive harm” and “relevant mar-
ket.”  Consider, first, the concept of competitive harm.  Competitive 
harm is not any harm.  Under the antitrust laws, courts require in-
179 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. 
180 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436; Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 
2 Stat. 171, 171; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.  Professor Patterson 
believed that Congress inserted the word “copying” intending it to apply only to works 
of the fine arts, Patterson, supra note 45, at 259, to which Congress extended copyright 
in 1870, Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. at 212.  If this were true, it would mean that 
most copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right of reproduction only by accident.  Cf. 
Patterson, supra note 51, at 12 (describing how the 1909 Copyright Act “unwittingly 
enlarged the copyright owner’s rights”). 
181 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”); id. § 106(1) (providing copyright own-
ers with the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”). 
182 See Patterson, supra note 51, at 6. 
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jured parties to demonstrate that their injuries were caused by an 
anticompetitive practice “of the type the antitrust laws were intended 
to prevent,”183 such as predatory pricing.184  Because “[t]he antitrust 
laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition not competitors,’ 
[i]t is inimical to the purposes of [those] laws to award damages for 
the type of injury” that flows merely from vigorous competition.185  
The law of unfair competition imposes a similar requirement.  Ac-
cording to the Restatement, “[t]he freedom to compete necessarily con-
templates the probability of harm to . . . other participants in the mar-
ket,”186 as when, for example, a producer lowers prices, raises quality, 
or otherwise satisfies consumer desires better than its rivals do.  The 
law exists to remedy only those “harm[s] resulting from particular 
methods of competition determined to be unfair,” including trade-
mark infringement and other practices likely to have a negative im-
pact on the public.187
Copyright law, too, recognizes that some harms are not cognizable.  
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
for example, the fact that a parody may suppress demand for the 
original does not make the use “unfair.”188  According to the Court, 
“the only harm” with which courts need concern themselves “is the 
harm of market substitution.”189  Echoing this language, a number of 
courts have suggested that substitutive works cause competitive harms, 
while complementary works do not.190  As Judge Richard Posner ob-
183 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (quoting 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
184 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986) (“In contrast 
to price cutting aimed simply at increasing market share, predatory pricing has as its 
aim the elimination of competition.”).
185 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 320 (1962)).
186 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995). 
187 Id. § 1 & cmt. a. 
188 510 U.S. 569, 591-92, 594 (1994). 
189 Id. at 593; see also On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (ob-
serving that fair use would be found, notwithstanding market harm, “[i]f the harm re-
sulted from a transformative . . . use that lowered the public’s estimation of the origi-
nal (such as a devastating review of a book that quotes liberally from the original to 
show how silly and poorly written it is)”); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal 
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A court would not find it relevant . . . that 
[a] devastating critique had diminished sales by convincing the public that the original 
work was of poor quality.”).
190 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 
(1985) (“The Nation’s use had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose 
of supplanting the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publica-
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served in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., “copying that is 
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are 
complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute 
for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for 
pegs or screws) . . . is not fair use.”191  “If the price of nails fell,” Judge 
Posner wrote, “the demand for hammers would rise . . . . The hammer 
manufacturer wants there to be an abundant supply of cheap nails.”192
The problem with this argument is that unlike hammers and nails, 
copyrighted works can change in form and substance, giving them the 
ability to exist in several markets at the same time.  As Judge Posner 
recognized, copyright owners want courts not only to enjoin those 
copies that substitute for their works, but also those copies that “sub-
stitute . . . for derivative works from the copyrighted work.”193  In other 
words, copyright owners want exclusivity not only in the existing mar-
kets for their works, but also in derivative markets they may (or may 
not) develop in the future.194  In Ty, the owner of copyrights in Beanie 
Babies wanted to control not only the market in Beanie Babies them-
selves, but also the markets in photographs of and books about Beanie 
Babies.  Judge Posner elided the issue of derivative markets by holding 
that at least some of the books about Beanie Babies were not “deriva-
tive works”195—thus answering a slightly different question.196  In fact, 
tion.”); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(Marcus, C.J., specially concurring) (“[T]he preliminary record . . . suggests that The 
Wind Done Gone will not act as a substitute for Mitchell’s original. . . . [F]urther factfind-
ing may well reveal that these two books will act as complements rather than substi-
tutes.”); On Davis, 246 F.3d at 175-76 (“If . . . the secondary use, by copying the first, 
offers itself as a market substitute and in that fashion harms the market value of the 
original, this factor argues strongly against a finding of fair use.”); Consumers Union, 724 
F.2d at 1051 (“The fourth fair use factor will come into play if too much is copied or if 
the entire plot is revealed, thereby usurping the demand for the original work.”).
191 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
192 Id. 
193 Id. (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  
§ 13.05[B][1], at 13-193 (2002)). 
194 Judge Posner explained: 
A photograph of a Beanie Baby is not a substitute for a Beanie Baby.  No one 
who wants a Beanie Baby, whether a young child who wants to play with it or 
an adult (or older child) who wants to collect Beanie Babies, would be 
tempted to substitute a photograph.  But remember that photographs of 
Beanie Babies are conceded to be derivative works, for which there may be a 
separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit . . . . 
Id. at 518-19.
195 Id. at 520-21.
196 Id. at 520.  He also declined to address the question of whether Ty was engag-
ing in copyright misuse by using its copyrights to squelch criticism of the company.  Id. 
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however, there was no way for Judge Posner to know whether the cop-
ies at issue were complements or substitutes (and thus whether there 
was competitive harm) without deciding, first, whether the markets in 
which Ty claimed exclusivity were relevant markets to which it should 
have been entitled. 
This is a question for Congress, not the courts, but Congress has 
not yet answered it.  Worse, in failing to define the “relevant markets” 
in copyrighted works, lawmakers are giving copyright owners the 
power to define the scope of their own property rights by enabling 
them to occupy those markets in which they wish to exercise exclusiv-
ity.  Consider what would happen if courts gave monopolists the 
power to define the relevant market in antitrust law:  if the market 
were defined broadly enough, even Microsoft would have an insignifi-
cant share of it.  Similarly, in copyright law, if the market for a copy-
righted work were defined broadly enough, every unauthorized use of 
that work would give rise to infringement liability because every such 
use would be “competing”—whether in original or derivative markets.  
The result would be a copyright law that provided creators with plenty 
of inducement to create (in the form of exclusive rights), but that ne-
glected other strands of the public interest, such as the existence of 
open and populous markets in copyrighted expression.  In other 
words, the result would be the copyright law we have today. 
How might lawmakers define (and confine) the relevant markets 
in copyrighted works?  The answer is not to ask, as lawmakers have 
done, whether giving creators this or that exclusive right in this or that 
market would provide them with an enhanced inducement to create.  
As I have argued elsewhere, changes in the law have conditioned crea-
tors to expect an increasing reward for engaging in the act of crea-
tion—and creators have formed incentives accordingly.197  Lawmakers 
hasten to safeguard those incentives by granting more rights, those 
rights create higher expectations among creators, and the result is a 
cycle in which the property right grows increasingly broad.198  The 
 
197 Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 439 
(2007). 
198 Id.; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 4), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=918871 (explaining how the “practice of unneeded 
licensing feeds back into doctrine,” creating “a steady, incremental, unintended ex-
pansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent 
behavior on the part of copyright users”). 
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only way to escape the cycle is for lawmakers to ask not what creators 
have come to expect in the way of rights, but what creators are enti-
tled to expect given the nature of the public interest in copyright.199
C.  The “Predatory Competitive Practice” of Public Distribution 
Because the public interacts with different types of works in dif-
ferent ways, the rights that creators are entitled to expect from copy-
right law are likely to vary with the type of work at issue.200  When it 
comes to printed works201 such as books, however, the answer is rea-
sonably clear:  most authors write books so that others might pay to 
read them.  To accomplish this goal, authors (or their publishers) 
make copies of those books and release those copies to the public in 
return for money.202  The publication of books implicates the exclu-
sive rights of reproduction and distribution, but of the two rights, the 
public distribution right is the one on which profit depends.203  It is no 
accident that Congress once conditioned the grant of statutory pro-
tection on the fact of publication; not only does publication benefit 
199 Stadler, supra note 197, at 476-77. 
200 Consider the case of works that exist in a single copy, such as original paintings 
and sculpture:  for many “collectors of fine art, there [is] no substitute for the origi-
nal,” making the relevant market in those works so narrow that the benefits of copy-
right might not be worth the costs of granting protection.  Stadler, supra note 62, at 
651. 
201 See id. at 634 (defining “printed works” as “works that could be replicated with-
out diminishing their market value among intended users making intended uses”).  
Professor Landes and Judge Posner use the term “easily copied works.”  William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 335 (1989). 
202 Authors might write books for other reasons, of course.  Some of those reasons 
might have nothing to do with money—as if, for example, authors were motivated to 
write books in the hopes of becoming famous.  Other motivations might be more mer-
cenary:  authors might write books so they can demand a royalty whenever their books 
are sold by used bookstores or loaned by libraries, or even shared among friends.  As 
strange as it may seem, some authors might be motivated to write books so they can 
demand a royalty in the event an Internet services company (like Google) decides to 
scan their books and make the resulting digital images searchable on the Internet.  But 
just how relevant is each of these motivations?  Given that some types of harms are not 
“competitive harms” in “relevant markets,” harms to these markets might not be cogni-
zable, which is another way of saying that satisfying the foregoing expectations of re-
ward might not serve the public interest.  Thus, even if some authors would not create 
without being granted the right to exclude these uses, copyright law does not (and 
should not) respond by providing an inducement here. 
203 Patterson, supra note 51, at 7 (“[I]f copyright encourages creation, it does so 
only for the purpose of profit.  Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribu-
tion.”). 
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authors, but “intellectual conceptions benefit the public only when 
they are released.”204  In providing authors (and their publishers) with 
the exclusive right of public distribution, copyright law secures this 
public benefit by enabling authors and their publishers to prohibit 
others from competing “unfairly”—by marketing the products of crea-
tion in which they did not invest.  In other words, by granting creators 
the distribution right, copyright law holds that unauthorized public 
distributions are acts of unfair, even “predatory” competition.205
What of unauthorized reproductions?  Professor Patterson once 
described the right to copy as “a predicate right”;206 that is, one cannot 
distribute copies of a work to the public without making those copies 
in the first place.  In other words, the act of public distribution re-
quires a predicate act of reproduction, but acts of reproduction can 
(and indeed, do) happen without the results being distributed to the 
public.  Indeed, as we have seen, many (if not most) acts of copying 
are done in private.  Do these private acts of copying constitute acts of 
unfair competition?  Alternatively, do they cause competitive harms in 
the relevant markets to which authors and their publishers are enti-
tled?  At first blush, the answer might seem to be “yes” because these 
acts, if unauthorized, might deprive copyright owners of sales—as 
when, for example, friends lend each other books, hoping to share a 
literary experience.207  Even if sharing among friends causes “harm” in 
the form of lost sales, however, that harm might not be one that the 
law should characterize as “competitive” because, on balance, such 
sharing might benefit the public.  Copyright law does not (and should 
not) exist to internalize every externality that affects the public in a 
positive way.  To quote Professor Mark Lemley, “part of the point of 
intellectual property law is to promote uncompensated positive exter-
nalities, by ensuring that ideas and works that might otherwise be kept 
secret are widely disseminated.”208  Indeed, as Professor Lemley has 
observed, giving copyright owners the right to capture the value of 
204 Stadler, supra note 62, at 632. 
205 See Patterson, supra note 51, at 7. 
206 Patterson, supra note 45, at 262; see also Patterson, supra note 51, at 42 (“If the 
courts had perceived the dilemma, they could have avoided it easily by recognizing 
that the right to copy was, in fact, the right to copy and vend.”). 
207 But see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringe-
ment Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1429 (2004) (describing shar-
ing that occurs only “among small groups of friends, rather than open sharing with 
strangers” as a “major victory” for “copyright enforcers”). 
208 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1052 (2005). 
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every use (i.e., to eliminate free riding) would impose significant 
costs—not only on society, but also on creators themselves.209
If, as I argue, copyright owners suffer “competitive harms” only 
when others engage in acts of public distribution, then granting crea-
tors the exclusive right of reproduction provides them with a greater 
benefit than they are entitled to expect.  In other words, granting 
creators (and their assigns) the reproduction right denies the public 
the opportunity to access copyrighted works in ways that pose no sig-
nificant threat to inducement—and indeed, might provide the public 
with other benefits, such as expressive diversity.  Suppose, however, 
that Congress were to remove subsection (1) from section 106 of the 
Copyright Act, which provides copyright owners with the exclusive 
right of reproduction, leaving subsection (3), which provides the ex-
clusive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”210  If copyright owners enjoyed the distribution right, but 
not the reproduction right, then copyright owners would enjoy the 
exclusive right to release copies of their works to the public, as they do 
today.  Copyright owners could not prevent others from copying their 
works, but they would have the right to exclude those unauthorized 
copies from the marketplace. 
The distribution right has its limits, of course.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that at least some people might create so as to earn a royalty 
every time a copy of their work changes hands, Congress has deter-
mined that creators are not entitled to expect those royalties, at least 
insofar as authorized copies are concerned.  Under the first sale doc-
trine, the first public distribution of a work in copies exhausts the dis-
209 See id. at 1058-65 (describing the economic costs of granting creators absolute 
rights).  Justice O’Connor has similarly observed: 
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used 
by others without compensation.  As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, 
however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.”  It is, 
rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional requirement.  The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 
Feist Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citations omitted).
210 At present, section 106 provides copyright owners with “the exclusive rights to 
do and to authorize any of the following:  (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords; . . . [and] (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending.”  17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000).  As noted in Part I above, I do not 
address the other section 106 rights in this Article.  See supra notes 68-69 and accompa-
nying text. 
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tribution right as to those copies.211  In adopting this limitation almost 
a century ago,212 Congress clearly believed that the first sale doctrine 
would provide the public with more benefits than costs.  Accordingly, 
Congress defined the relevant market in printed works so as to limit 
that market to “first sales,” thus encouraging competitors to engage in 
the further distribution of lawful copies that already had reached the 
public.  The last hundred years suggests that Congress was right to do 
so:  encouraging competition in secondary markets for copyrighted 
works promotes the proliferation of copies, and it does so without ex-
posing creators to the kind of competition that likely would threaten 
their incentives to create. 
Perhaps the most significant limitations on the right, however, are 
found in the terms “public” and “distribution.”  Under section 106(3), 
copyright owners do not enjoy the right to prevent private distribu-
tions, nor do they have the right to exclude others from making uses 
that do not qualify as distribution in the first place.  Congress has not 
defined these terms in section 101, but in defining the word “publicly” 
(as it relates to performances and displays), Congress seems to have 
suggested that a public act necessarily involves a “substantial number 
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social ac-
quaintances.”213  The definition of “distribution” is more elusive.  As 
section 106(3) provides, distribution can occur “by sale or other trans-
fer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”214  In general, courts 
hold that distribution requires the “actual dissemination” of copies,215 
which means, in the digital world, “the transfer of a file from one 
211 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (providing that “the owner of a particular copy . . . law-
fully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, 
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”).  If section 106 were 
amended to remove the exclusive right of reproduction, then section 109(a) would 
have to be amended as well, for at least the reason that all copies would be “lawfully 
made”—even those copies made without the authorization of the copyright owner. 
212 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909) (providing 
that copyright owners cannot “forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained”). 
213 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
214 Id. § 106(3); see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-148 (“The copy-
right owner thus has the exclusive right publicly to sell, give away, rent or lend any ma-
terial embodiment of his work.” (footnote omitted)). 
215 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-149; see also Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. 
v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “even 
with respect to computer software, the distribution right is only the right to distribute 
copies of the work”); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. 
Cal. 2005) (noting support for the “view that distribution of a copyrighted work re-
quires the transfer of an identifiable copy of that work”). 
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computer to another.”216  Thus, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, Justice 
Ginsburg observed for the Court that, “by selling copies of the [copy-
righted] Articles through the NEXIS Database,” defendant 
LEXIS/NEXIS “‘distribute[d] copies’ of the Articles ‘to the public by 
sale.’”217  Mere transmissions that do not involve a file transfer, how-
ever, likely do not constitute distribution (although they may qualify 
as a performance or display).218
Taken together, these limitations shed considerable light on the 
scope of the right that copyright owners would enjoy if, as I have pro-
posed, Congress were to provide them with the distribution right, but 
not the reproduction right.  As under existing law, copyright owners 
would enjoy the exclusive right to release copies of their works to the 
public, but they could not control later distributions of those copies, 
nor could they control how members of the public interacted with 
those copies in private.  This means, necessarily, that a consumer who 
216 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 844 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
217 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001).  Alternatively, as Justice Stevens suggested in dissent, 
the NEXIS service may have constituted nothing more than an offer to distribute cop-
ies.  Id. at 518 n.14 (“Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that NEXIS makes it 
possible for users to make and distribute copies.”). 
 Would such an offer constitute “distribution?”  The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has suggested that the answer is yes.  In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997), the court held that when a public 
library “adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or catalog system, and 
makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public,” the library has engaged 
in public distribution—even if there is no evidence that copies of the work changed 
hands.  But this cannot be right.  There is ample evidence that Congress intended “dis-
tribution” to overlap with the concept of “publication,” which section 101 defines as 
either (1) “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”; or (2) “[t]he offering to 
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distri-
bution, public performance, or public display.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (observing that sec-
tion 106(3) “recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, 
which had previously been an element of the common-law protections afforded un-
published works”).  Under this definition, an offer to distribute copies of a work to the 
public for the purpose of reproduction would not constitute publication—and arguably 
would not constitute distribution, either.  See Napster, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (“[T]o the 
extent that Hotaling suggests that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives 
rise to liability under section 106(3),” that suggestion was contrary to case law and “in-
consistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976.”).  Even so, 
“courts have not hesitated to find copyright infringement by distribution” in cases in-
volving peer-to-peer (p2p) networks.  Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
218 See 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.11[A], at 8-149 (“Given that transmissions 
qualify as public performances, liability for that conduct lies outside the distribution 
right.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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purchased an authorized copy of a copyrighted work could sell or give 
that copy to a total stranger, toss it in the street, or “otherwise dispose” 
of it219—even if that copy existed in digital form.220  That consumer 
could make unauthorized copies of the work for herself, to use in pri-
vate, as she chose.  She also could give those copies to family and 
friends for their private use.  She probably should refrain from offer-
ing to distribute copies of the work to those who might engage in “fur-
ther distribution, public performance, or public display.”221  Regard-
less, she would have a considerable range of uses to which she could 
put the work.  She simply could not distribute copies of the work to 
the public; that is, she could not seek to compete with the copyright 
owner in the marketplace for copies. 
If this were the law, what result?  In providing creators with exclu-
sive public distribution rights, but not exclusive reproduction rights, 
Congress would enable copyright owners to capture the value in some 
uses of their works without forcing the public to sacrifice other inter-
ests that copyright law was meant to promote.  Creators would con-
tinue to enjoy adequate incentives to create, and the public would 
gain increased access to copyrighted works and would reap a number 
of other significant benefits.  Part III examines those benefits. 
III.  ON THE UTILITY OF COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 
A.  Solving the “Problem” of Personal Copying 
Most copyright scholars agree that almost nothing poses a greater 
threat to the enterprise of creation than the “problem” of unauthor-
ized copying.  To quote Professor Marshall Leaffer, the “‘copying 
problem’ presents challenges that transcend qualitatively anything in 
history, and the economic stakes are greater than ever.”222  Scholars 
have responded to these challenges by proposing a number of solu-
219 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); see supra note 211.
220 But see 2 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 8.12[E], at 8-179 to 8-183 (discussing 
whether the first sale doctrine applies to digital copies). 
221 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “publication”); see also supra note 217 and accompa-
nying text.  In other words, given the relationship between distribution and publica-
tion, she probably should refrain from engaging in a “general publication”—that is, 
from making copies of the work “available to members of the public regardless of who 
they are or what they will do with it.”  Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative 
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991). 
222 Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Market-
place, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 850 (2001). 
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tions, of which Professor Peter Yu has documented no fewer than 
eight.  As he warns, however, there is “no panacea.”223  One way to 
solve the “copying problem,” of course, is to remove the right of re-
production from the list of exclusive rights in section 106—thus mak-
ing copying perfectly legal.  According to Professor William Patry and 
Judge Richard Posner, however, this solution “would be the undoing 
of copyright.”224  Why?  To be sure, the word “copyright” signifies the 
“right” to “copy,” but any exclusive grant of the reproduction right 
should rest upon a stronger foundation than semantics. 
Scholars have competing theories as to why copying so threatens 
the enterprise of creation.  One theory (to which Patry and Posner 
subscribe) is that reproduction forces down prices of copyrighted 
works, thus depriving copyright owners of profits and thereby reduc-
ing their incentives to create.225  As Professor Raymond Ku has ob-
served, “[i]f competition from copiers drives the price of a work down 
to the marginal costs of the copier, it threatens the incentives to dis-
tribute the work in the first place.”226  Even Professor Lunney, who ad-
vocates some private copying, has warned that instances of private 
copying, “[a]lthough individually trivial, . . . in the aggregate could 
radically reduce the incentive to create any given work of author-
ship.”227
Yet acts of copying alone would not produce these results.  Only 
the distribution of unauthorized copies would tend to increase supply, 
thus resulting in decreased prices (at least in a competitive market).  
Further, only the public distribution of unauthorized copies would 
tend to increase supply enough to have any appreciable effect on 
prices.  The private distribution of unauthorized copies might deprive 
copyright owners of at least some profits as consumers shared pur-
chased copies within “normal circle[s] of . . . family and . . . social ac-
quaintances.”228  But given how broadly the courts have construed the 
223 Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 698-
740 (2005). 
224 William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of 
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2004). 
225 See id. 
226 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction:  Fair Use Beyond Market 
Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 548 (2003). 
227 Lunney, supra note 5, at 818; see also Patry & Posner, supra note 224, at 1644 
(arguing that “unlimited” copying “would make it difficult and in some cases impossi-
ble for authors of expressive works to recoup their expenses in creating [their] 
work[s]”). 
228 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “publicly”).
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statutory definition of “publicly,”229 private distributions would likely 
involve relatively few copies, which means that any lost profits would 
be unlikely to have a significant effect on the inducement to create.230  
This may be why “[c]opyright owners in the twentieth century sued 
counterfeiters but generally did not sue end users even if they were 
making illegal copies”:231  the benefits of enforcement did not justify 
the costs.232  Unfortunately, this approach seems increasingly anach-
ronistic.233
If copying is thought to pose more of a threat to copyright owners 
today, it is because technological advances are enabling copiers to 
make “perfect copies” (and “perfect copies of the copies”) at “mas-
sive[ly] declin[ing]” costs.234  As before, however, the problem is not 
229 As the court wrote in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., “[t]he Copy-
right Act . . . does not require that the public place be actually crowded with people.  A 
telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a pay toilet are commonly regarded as ‘open to 
the public,’ even though they are usually occupied only by one party at a time.”  800 
F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986).  The court went on to hold that a video rental store per-
formed copyrighted audiovisual works “publicly” by permitting patrons to watch video-
cassettes in private screening rooms.  Id; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd 
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a video rental store per-
formed copyrighted audiovisual works “publicly” by transmitting those works to private 
screening rooms).
230 Even public distribution may not have as significant an effect on inducement as 
previously feared.  See Daniel Gross, Does a Free Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2004, at Business 4 (discussing a recent study showing only a “small correla-
tion” between music downloads and lost sales).
231 Lemley & Reese, supra note 207, at 1374. 
232 See Wu, supra note 115, at 338 (“While this point is complicated by improved 
technologies of copy protection, so long as there exist rights that would be extremely 
expensive to enforce, the model of broad initial grants cannot be a complete an-
swer.”). 
233 In 1970, for example, Stephen Breyer (then a law professor) complained that 
“[a] law-abiding user wishing to copy only a portion of a book or article . . . [would] 
have to buy the whole book at a store or face the difficulty and cost of contacting the 
copyright owner, bargaining with him, and arranging for payment.”  Stephen Breyer, 
The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Pro-
grams, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 316 (1970); see also Litman, supra note 78, at 932 (“When 
Congress extended copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971, it had repeat-
edly affirmed that the Copyright Act did not then reach consumer home taping of mu-
sic, and would not reach it as amended.”).  Today, copyright owners are likely to take 
the position that a “law-abiding user” can never copy, even if the user purchased the 
book from which she wishes to copy.  But see Gordon, supra note 3, at 190 (describing a 
“judicial and legislative unwillingness to impose copyright liability on individual at-
home users”). 
234 Lemley & Reese, supra note 207, at 1376; see also Lunney, supra note 5, at 849 
(“Digital technology has fundamentally altered copyright doctrine by making wide-
spread public copying possible.”).
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one of reproduction, but rather of distribution.  The most significant 
impact of technological advancement has been the transformation of 
consumers into public distributors.  With the click of a mouse, a per-
son can use her computer to send thousands of “perfect copies” of 
copyrighted works to thousands of strangers, or to make those copies 
available for downloading by thousands more.  Previously, this kind of 
distribution required a significant amount of investment, and the re-
sulting barriers to entry created the very oligopolies that are so quick 
to blame reproduction technologies for their problems. 
A second theory as to why copying causes harm is that copying 
forces copyright owners to raise the prices of copies of their works, 
presumably because competition from copiers leads to fewer sales for 
copyright owners, thereby forcing copyright owners to maintain reve-
nues by charging higher prices.235  According to the laws of econom-
ics, however, if copyright owners were losing market share to copiers, 
then raising prices would be counterproductive.  Copyright owners 
who insisted on charging higher prices in such a competitive market 
would, in the end, watch their market share erode considerably.  Re-
gardless, it would be unfair to blame copying alone for these competi-
tive harms.  Consider an example from the music industry:  one sus-
pects that record companies decided to give consumers the (legal) 
opportunity to download individual songs at reasonable prices by par-
ticipating in the iTunes music store only because online “distributors” 
forced those companies to change the way in which they distributed 
music.  A guy in his basement can copy thousands of copyrighted 
songs onto his hard drive, but he only inflicts competitive harm on 
copyright owners when he makes those copies available to the public.  
Record companies may love the reproduction right because it enables 
them to threaten litigation against (and thus frighten away) as many 
members of the public as possible,236 but this is not a good enough 
reason to retain a right that Professor Julie Cohen has described as 
“recogniz[ing] few boundaries,” “drafted extraordinarily broadly in 
235 See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
217, 222 (“Prices would be lower in the absence of copying . . . .”).
236 See Cohen, supra note 48, at 965 (noting that the Copyright Register’s proposal 
urging copyright holders to “adopt voluntary norms of self-restraint” requires 
“[a]ppropriate norms to govern the public conduct of users [to] be publicly inculcated 
through a combination of persuasion and fear, which means that judiciously targeted 
lawsuits against users still have a role to play”). 
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the first instance, and . . . extended even more broadly by the 
courts.”237
If the “predicate right”238 of reproduction provides copyright own-
ers with few benefits, there are significant public benefits to be gained 
by withholding such a right.  First, as we have seen, giving members of 
the public the right to make copies of copyrighted works would in-
crease access to those works during the copyright term without sub-
jecting copyright owners to the kind of unfair competition that might 
reduce their incentives to create.  That access, in turn, would lead to 
the creation of thousands of tangible copies—copies whose creation 
the law now seeks both to prevent and to punish, regardless of 
whether those copies are being used to compete unfairly with the 
copyright owner.  Not only are there significant archival benefits to be 
gained by the proliferation of tangible copies,239 but as I have argued, 
the proliferation and distribution of copyrighted works in tangible 
form also promote the enterprise of learning.  In fact, copyright law 
always has recognized this relationship.240  Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to provide authors 
with exclusive rights only in “Writings,”241 and, accordingly, Congress 
has defined copyrightable works as only those “original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”242  If the fixa-
tion requirement serves other purposes—including evidentiary on-
237 Cohen, supra note 133, at 160. 
238 Patterson, supra note 45, at 262; see also Patterson, supra note 51, at 42 (“If the 
courts had perceived the dilemma, they could have avoided it easily by recognizing 
that the right to copy was, in fact, the right to copy and vend.”). 
239 Professor Gregory Lastowka has observed that “[c]opies of the past were valu-
able objects,” and if anything happened to the power grid, copies of the future would 
be valuable objects, too.  F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 300 (2001); see also Michael J. Madison, Legal-
Ware:  Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1061 (1998) 
(“Books and other information in physical form, however, continue to play an impor-
tant role.”). 
240 The House Report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act noted the Com-
mittee’s concern that “marketplace realities may someday dictate . . . less access, rather 
than more, to copyrighted materials,” and that this “result could flow from a conflu-
ence of factors, including the elimination of print or other hard-copy versions.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998). 
241 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  In the Trade-mark Cases, the Supreme Court de-
fined “writings” to mean “the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, 
prints, engravings, and the like.”  100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
242 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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es243—it also provides the public with a tangible benefit in return for 
the impediment to access that the grant of exclusive rights repre-
sents.244
Granting the public more access to copyrighted expression also 
might promote expressive diversity in surprising ways.  To the extent 
that the law today requires members of the public to be “consumers” 
instead of “users,” copyright owners can train the public to satisfy its 
demand for expression by looking to the copyright industries alone.  
As Professor Benkler has argued (using Disney as an example), “in-
creased prevalence of Mickeys should lead to increased investment in 
forming preferences for their products.  This should increase relative 
demand for their products.  Repackaging the Mouse becomes not 
only cost effective, but also responsive to demand.”245  In time, the 
public tends to forget that the copyright industries are not the only 
sources of creative expression.  If, however, the public enjoyed the 
right not only to “experience” copyrighted works,246 but also to make 
copies of those works for private use, people might begin to interact 
with copyrighted works in ways that raised the “common denomina-
tor,”247 at least in their own lives (and the lives of family and friends).  
Meaningful access to creative works inspires creativity.  Further, if the 
public began to view copyrighted works not only as finished products, 
but also as raw materials, demand for those works might even in-
crease.  So might the value of the copyrights themselves, as users seek 
to license the right to market their improvements.248
Yet another significant benefit of withholding the exclusive right 
of reproduction relates to derivative liability.  Since the Supreme 
Court grappled with the issue of contributory liability in Sony Corp. of 
243 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730-34 
(2003) (examining the evidence rationales for the fixation requirement). 
244 See Wu, supra note 115, at 361 (“[F]ixed media has the advantage of the fixed 
form, packaging, and in some cases a superior product (real books are beautiful, very 
portable, and operate without batteries).”). 
245 Benkler, supra note 130, at 97-98. 
246 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 115-16 (discussing how new media influ-
ences how people experience works, and how copyright law responds to new media). 
247 See Lunney, supra note 5, at 888-89 (“Seeking the common denominator among 
a wider audience leads almost inevitably to a lower common denominator.”). 
248 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997) (arguing that intellectual property laws help 
inventors and the public by providing incentives for improving inventions).
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America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,249 copyright owners have brought 
copyright infringement actions against manufacturers of copying 
technologies that enable consumers to engage in unauthorized acts of 
reproduction.  In Sony, the Court held that under the “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine, “the sale of copying equipment . . . does not 
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”250  “Indeed,” the Court added, 
that product “need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.”251  In the last twenty years, however, copyright owners have con-
vinced courts repeatedly to distinguish the holding in Sony, and the 
Court itself did so in 2005.252  These days, manufacturers of copying 
devices may be guilty of contributory infringement if they distribute 
those devices “with the object of promoting [their] use to infringe 
copyright”253—even if those devices are “capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses.”254  As Professor Jessica Litman has observed, “[d]efining 
an appropriate boundary between contributory infringers and innova-
tors in digital technology seems even more crucial today than it did 
when the Court decided Sony.”255  Although that boundary promises to 
remain elusive, it cannot be drawn if acts of copying alone are punish-
able as copyright infringement. 
249 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  For a description of the aftermath of Sony, see Litman, 
supra note 78, at 947-60. 
250 464 U.S. at 442. 
251 Id. 
252 The Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. in-
structed that “[w]here evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowl-
edge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to 
promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”  125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2779 (2005).  The Court observed that “the summary judgment record [was] re-
plete with other evidence that Grokster and StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and 
distributor in Sony, acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of soft-
ware suitable for illegal use.”  Id. at 2781.
253 Id. at 2767; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-22 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster knew of specific infringing material on its sys-
tem, could have blocked it, failed to purge it, and therefore could be liable for con-
tributory infringement).  The holdings in Sony, Napster, and Grokster are not limited to 
new technologies, of course.  As Judge Leval once asked, “why not also enjoin the use 
of the camera, the audio-tape recorder, the photocopier, and the computer—perhaps 
even pen and paper, or the printing press[?]”  Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1997). 
254 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 & n.12 (citing and distinguishing Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 442). 
255 Litman, supra note 78, at 960. 
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If copyright owners were unable to exclude others from copying 
their works, then by definition they could not bring infringement ac-
tions against manufacturers of copying technologies (like the one in 
Sony) for enabling those acts of copying.  Liability for contributory in-
fringement derives from acts of direct infringement, which means 
there can be no derivative liability absent a violation of the Copyright 
Act.256  The benefit of withholding the reproduction right would be 
obvious for manufacturers of devices, such as computers, that cannot 
function without making copies.  But that benefit also would be obvi-
ous for consumers, who would have the opportunity to purchase those 
copying technologies without funding payments of royalties.  In the 
end, contributory liability would continue to be a threat only to those 
companies (like Napster and Grokster) that enable and induce257 us-
ers to engage in the public distribution of unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted works, thus causing competitive harm.  If this is not a per-
fect boundary “between contributory infringers and innovators in 
digital technology,” it certainly is an appropriate one.258
B.  Preempting the End Run Around Copyright 
In addition to forcing third parties (such as manufacturers of 
copying technologies) to police infringements, copyright owners also 
have used other laws to control the ways in which the public interacts 
with their works:  first, by seeking to enforce restrictive “end user li-
cense agreements” under contract law, mostly for computer software, 
and second, by persuading lawmakers to enact new laws (such as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)259) prohibiting users from 
circumventing the encryption of copyrighted works—even in pur-
chased copies.260  Scholars have characterized both of these end runs 
256 Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
257 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (defining “inducement of infringement” as “ad-
vertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an 
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringe-
ment was encouraged”). 
258 Litman, supra note 78, at 960.  Professor Litman argues that the need for a co-
herent boundary is still a pressing one, but that the Sony line “makes more policy 
sense” than the line drawn by “any of its competitors.”  Id. 
259 Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified at  
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)). 
260 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (prohibiting the circumvention of any 
“technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [title 
17]”). 
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around copyright as serious, even devastating blows to the public in-
terest in copyright, in part because neither contract law nor anticir-
cumvention law makes exception for fair uses of copyrighted works.261  
As Professors Dan Burk and Julie Cohen have articulated the problem, 
“[w]here technological constraints substitute for legal constraints, 
control over the design of information rights is shifted into the hands 
of private parties, who may or may not honor the public policies that 
animate public access doctrines such as fair use.”262
Notwithstanding the importance of these public policies, most 
courts have upheld efforts to enforce exclusive rights by means of con-
tractual or technological controls.  In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, for ex-
ample, the court was asked to consider the enforceability under con-
tract law of a “shrinkwrap” license prohibiting buyers from engaging, 
inter alia, in the public distribution of databases containing telephone 
directories.263  (The distribution of the contents of those databases 
would not constitute copyright infringement because under section 
102(b) of the Copyright Act, protection does not extend to facts such 
as telephone numbers.264)  Writing for the court, Judge Frank Easter-
brook held that the Copyright Act (in section 301(a)) did not pre-
empt the enforcement of that license under contract law because the 
“rights created by contract [were not] ‘equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright.’”265  As for techno-
logical controls, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley that the prohibition in section 
1201(a) of the DMCA is not subject to the fair use provisions of sec-
261 See Gordon, supra note 5, at 915 (“[O]verbroad contract rules and the DMCA 
are the true threats.  They threaten the culturally-viable practices that fair use has his-
torically sheltered.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Li-
censes, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 513 (1997) (“If these [shrinkwrap] ‘licenses’ are uni-
formly enforceable, all of the users’ rights of copyright will soon disappear.”); Lunney, 
supra note 5, at 814-15 (arguing that the DMCA promotes the private interests of copy-
right holders over the public interest).  But see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 146-47 (argu-
ing that “[b]oth the critics and the proponents of anti-circumvention rules have 
probably overstated the capacity of encryption measures to close off access to literary 
and artistic works” and noting that “[a]ny signal that can be seen or heard can also be 
copied, and without circumventing any encryption technology”). 
262 Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 51.  But see Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 125 
(“[T]he ‘market failure’ genre of fair use should fade away in a world of . . . direct en-
forcement of copyright through access controls.”). 
263 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49 (7th Cir. 1996). 
264 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding 
that the alphabetical arrangement of telephone numbers in a directory was not origi-
nal and therefore not subject to copyright). 
265 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000)).
  
2007] COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 951 
 
tion 107.266  As the court observed, “[w]e know of no authority for the 
proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less 
the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in 
the identical format of the original.”267
These decisions contain echoes of grievance, as if courts perceive 
the remedies under copyright law to be inadequate to punish inva-
sions of the property right, most of which involve acts of copying.  The 
result is a “law of control” that violates the spirit, if not the terms, of 
section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides that those “legal 
or equitable” rights equivalent to copyright are to be “governed exclu-
sively by [title 17].”268  On the subject of contractual controls, scholars 
have urged courts to invigorate the doctrine of preemption,269 but the 
solution is not without its problems:  how much of the state law on 
contracts do federal courts have the stomach to preempt?  As Profes-
sor Lemley put it, “[u]sing preemption doctrine against contracts is 
something like swinging a sledgehammer at a gnat:  you are likely to 
hit the target, but you may do some serious damage to the things 
around it.”270  Worse, perhaps, “you might decide not to swing the 
hammer at all, for fear of hitting the wrong thing.”271  If preemption 
seems tricky, try this proposed solution to the problems posed by tech-
nological controls:  Professors Burk and Cohen have suggested that 
the federal government create (and fund) an “escrow agent” whose 
sole job would be to issue “keys,” case by case, to users who could 
demonstrate a need for access to encrypted works.272  A far simpler so-
lution, of course, would be enacting “an explicit . . . fair use exemp-
266 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001). 
267 Id. at 459. 
268 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
269 See, e.g., Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 52 (“Where enforcement of a state law 
contract would violate the public policy inherent in the federal intellectual property 
scheme, or that embedded in the Constitution itself, such contractual provisions are 
preempted.”).  Professor Gordon predicts that “if such contracts become so ubiquitous 
that they attach to virtually all copies, the result will be so property-like that courts will 
subject the contracts to copyright preemption.”  Gordon, supra note 5, at 912. 
270 Lemley, supra note 121, at 145; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1269 (1995) (noting the “complex ques-
tion of whether and how to preempt certain parts of contract law without bringing 
down the whole edifice”). 
271 Lemley, supra note 121, at 145. 
272 Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 59-70.  “Rights holders that opt not to deposit 
keys with the escrow agent would be unable to invoke legal protection against circum-
vention.”  Id. at 66.  To their credit, Professors Burk and Cohen admit that their pro-
posal “is a second-best solution designed to make the best of a bad situation.”  Id. at 80. 
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tion from the anticircumvention provisions” of section 1201 of the 
DMCA, as Professor Benkler has suggested.273  As we have seen, how-
ever, fair use has its problems, too. 
Amending the copyright statute to withhold the exclusive right of 
reproduction would do what these proposals would not:  it would 
eliminate much of the claimed need for access controls by erasing 
many of the harms thought to justify those controls in the first place.  
Consider the DMCA.  Both the House and Senate reports issued in 
support of passage contain language suggesting that the DMCA is nec-
essary because of the threats posed by both unauthorized reproduc-
tion and unauthorized public distribution.  The language in the Sen-
ate report is typical:  “Due to the ease with which digital works can be 
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright 
owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Inter-
net without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against 
massive piracy.”274  Of the reproduction and distribution rights, how-
ever, the former has drawn the most notice.  For example, the Senate 
report instructs that section 1201(b) is meant to “prohibit[] devices 
primarily designed to circumvent . . . measures that limit the ability of 
the copyrighted work to be copied, or otherwise protect the copyright 
rights of the owner of the copyrighted work.”275  In Corley, too, the 
court focused almost exclusively on the threat posed by copying.  It 
did so, in part, by remonstrating “pirates” and “thieves,” whom it de-
scribed as those “who want to acquire [i.e., copy] copyrighted material 
(for personal use or resale) without paying for it.”276
273 Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation 
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access,  53 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 578 (1999-2000). 
274 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 
(1998) (“In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to 
reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works—at virtually no cost at all to the pi-
rate.”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Fearful 
that the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a copyrightable work in digi-
tal form was overwhelming the capacity of conventional copyright enforcement to find 
and enjoin unlawfully copied material, Congress sought to combat copyright piracy in 
its earlier stages, before the work was even copied.”). 
275 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 12 (emphasis added); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 441 
(“[T]he focus of subsection 1201(a)(2) is circumvention of technologies designed to 
prevent access to a work, and the focus of subsection 1201(b)(1) is circumvention of 
technologies designed to permit access to a work but prevent copying of the work or some 
other act that infringes a copyright.” (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 11-12 (1998))). 
276 273 F.3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]aking what is not yours and 
not freely offered to you is stealing.”). 
  
2007] COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 953 
 
If the exclusive right to make copies were not among those rights 
listed in section 106 of the Copyright Act, then it would not be a 
wrongful act to make copies of copyrighted works, so long as one did 
not also distribute those copies to the public.  Whither the rhetoric 
about piracy and thievery?  Copyright owners, of course, would con-
tinue to demand (and receive) protection against circumvention of 
those technologies designed to hinder distribution.  They might even 
continue to demand hindrances to copying, but one hopes, at least, 
that lawmakers would hesitate to grant copyright owners the right to 
prohibit the public from engaging in acts of copying that would be 
perfectly lawful under copyright law, in the service of which the 
DMCA was enacted in the first place.277  Of course, if Congress were to 
amend section 1201(a) of the DMCA to prohibit the circumvention of 
only those measures that “effectively control the public distribution of 
a work protected under Title 17,” the change probably would not stop 
copyright owners from using technological measures to try to prevent 
copying.  But it also would not stop users from employing technologi-
cal measures of their own.  As Professor Cohen has argued, 
“[c]opyright owners cannot be prohibited from making access to their 
works more difficult, but they should not be allowed to prevent others 
from hacking around their technological barriers.”278  This solution is 
only as good as the hackers that might provide it, but it may be good 
enough (for now). 
In the case of contracts, too, withholding the exclusive right of re-
production would deprive copyright owners of many of their justifica-
tions for imposing restrictive terms on purchasers of copies (e.g., of 
software).  Copyright owners likely would continue to require that us-
ers agree not to engage in acts of copying.  Because copying alone 
would be perfectly legal, however, copyright owners would be guilty of 
using contracts not to enhance their rights under copyright law, but to 
create new rights.  This effort to deny the public the benefits of legal-
izing reproduction would present a strong case for preemption, for as 
the Supreme Court warned in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
277 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 435 (noting that Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 “to 
strengthen copyright protection in the digital age”). 
278 Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws De-
signed To Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 178 (1997).  Professors Burk and 
Cohen have argued that “[i]n some instances of overreaching via technological con-
trols, the Constitution may even demand a limited . . . ‘right to hack,’ to surmount pri-
vately erected technological barriers to information that the Constitution requires be 
publicly accessible.”  Burk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 52. 
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“[w]hen state law touches upon the area of [the copyright and patent] 
statutes, it is ‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set 
at naught, or its benefits denied’ by the state law.”279  But even if 
courts would be hesitant to use the “coarser tools” of preemption, Pro-
fessor Lemley has argued that the “better tool” might be the doctrine 
of copyright misuse.280  Copyright misuse consists of the use of a copy-
right “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant 
of a copyright”—as when, for example, a licensor attempts to prevent 
its licensee from implementing the (unprotectable) ideas expressed in 
the licensed works.281  Contract terms that sought to prevent licensees 
from exercising their right to engage in copying sans public distribu-
tion likewise would “violat[e] . . . the public policy embodied in the 
grant of a copyright,”282 and therefore would render the offending 
copyright unenforceable “‘during the period of misuse.’”283  Again, 
this would not be a perfect solution, but it would result in a more eq-
uitable balance between “the claims of individuals” and “[t]he public 
good.”284
C.  Breathing Life into the Fair Use Defense 
If, as Professor Patterson argued, the “question is not ‘what is fair 
use?’ but ‘what is copyright?,’”285 then one cannot make sense of fair 
use without first deciding, as Professor Litman put it, “what we have a 
copyright law for.”286  Not surprisingly, there is a lack of agreement on 
this point.  While two hundred years ago copyright may have been a 
modest instrument of quid pro quo, today the “grand conception”287 
of copyright no longer can satisfy the demands that its many constitu-
279 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (citation omitted). 
280 Lemley, supra note 121, at 157-58; see also id. at 163 (suggesting, too, that courts 
might place “federal public policy limits on contract enforcement” without “invoking 
the mechanisms of preemption”). 
281 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990). 
282 Id. 
283 Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 
n.9 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 n.22)). 
284 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 61, at 279 (asserting that “[t]he public 
good fully coincides [in the case of both the “copyright of authors” and the “right to 
useful inventions”] with the claims of individuals”), quoted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). 
285 Patterson, supra note 45, at 249. 
286 Litman, supra note 45, at 365. 
287 Leval, supra note 43, at 1110. 
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encies have placed upon it.  Professor Lunney may have described the 
doctrine of fair use as “a central and vital arbiter between two compet-
ing public interests”288—namely, inducement and access—but in fact, 
that doctrine plays a minor role in the drama of copyright. 
There are two reasons for this.  First, an influential group of schol-
ars has convinced many courts that the public interest is best served 
when rights in copyrighted works can be acquired, parceled, and sold 
as if they were tangible property.289  The resulting commodification of 
creative expression is thought to serve the purposes of copyright law 
by enabling the market to distribute that expression to more people 
than it otherwise might reach.  Scholars who embrace this principle 
argue that the market, as opposed to the government, is best 
equipped to locate the most productive ways to exploit copyrightable 
works.290  As Professor Wendy Gordon once wrote, the primacy of the 
market means that fair use should exist only when the commodities 
market in expression “fails,” either because transaction costs are too 
high to facilitate a transaction, or because there is reason to believe 
that no market exists in the first place.291  If, in time, computer tech-
nology enables transactions with the click of a mouse, then fair use 
must shrink, as must the power of the government to diminish the 
rights that copyright holders enjoy.  In the words of Professor Paul 
Goldstein, “[f]or the great bulk of uses previously excused because of 
transaction costs, the doctrine will simply become irrelevant.”292
The second reason for the marginalization of fair use is that a dis-
tinguished jurist has convinced his fellow judges that the doctrine 
288 Lunney, supra note 24, at 977. 
289 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1148 (“To a considerable extent, primary 
resort to the market vindicates the copyright owner’s claim that the copyright is his 
property, to do with as he chooses; so long as a transfer may occur, he is allowed to ob-
tain as large a share of the profit as he can.”). 
290 See Netanel, supra note 55, at 309 (“For neoclassicists, copyright enables owners 
to charge users for access to creative work public goods not so much to preserve au-
thor incentives as to determine what creative works are worth and thus to create a 
guide for resource allocation.”). 
291 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1601.  Specifically, Professor Gordon has proposed 
to apply the fair use doctrine “[w]here (1) defendant could not appropriately pur-
chase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use to de-
fendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner’s incentives 
would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to proceed.”  Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
292 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 137; see also Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 125; Lunney, 
supra note 24, at 976 (“Interpreted as an exceptional instance of market failure, Sony 
has become its own limitation.”). 
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should be reserved for “transformative” works—that is, derivatives that 
“add[] value to the original . . . in the creation of new information, 
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”293  Ironically, Judge 
Leval proposed this test so that fair use would “not be considered a bi-
zarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of 
the copyright monopoly.”294  It has not worked out that way.  As Pro-
fessor Diane Zimmerman has observed, “[c]ourts now feel obliged to 
discuss the plausibility of virtually all fair use claims, at least in the first 
instance, in terms of whether or not they involve transformative 
uses.”295  Not surprisingly, for litigants, the name of the game is to re-
define “transformative” as the facts of the case demand, rendering the 
concept increasingly meaningless.296  Meanwhile, the test was never 
that much of a guide.  As Professor Lloyd Weinreb has pointed out, 
“[a] use may serve an important, socially useful purpose without being 
transformative, simply by making the copied material available.”297  
The Google Library Project is a perfect example. 
The problem underlying these interpretations of “fair use” is that 
the property rights to which the doctrine creates an exception have 
grown increasingly, even unmanageably, broad.  As those rights have 
broadened, courts have come under increasing pressure to preserve 
the “breathing space within the confines of copyright.”298  But the doc-
trine of fair use alone cannot provide that breathing space.  First, 
courts have many reasons for wishing to confine property rights, but 
one doctrine cannot account for those reasons in any coherent way.299  
Second, the fourth factor in section 107 of the Copyright Act—“the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
293 Leval, supra note 43, at 1111; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (describing a transformative work as a work that “adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning, or message”).
294 Leval, supra note 43, at 1110 (emphasis added).
295 Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 260. 
296 See id. at 262 (“Rather than adding certainty to the fair use analysis, [the trans-
formative use test] seems . . . merely to have pumped more silt into already muddy wa-
ters.”). 
297 Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1143; see also Lunney, supra note 24, at 977 (“Merely 
increasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a sufficient public 
interest to invoke the fair use doctrine.  A transformative or ‘productive’ use is not re-
quired.”). 
298 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
299 See Madison, supra note 7, at 402 (“The substantive emptiness of fair use makes 
it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t manage in 
other areas.”). 
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righted work”300—prevents courts from disappointing existing expec-
tations to any significant degree.  Over time, copyright owners have 
come to believe that they are, indeed, “ordinarily entitled to revenue 
for all substantial uses of [their] work[s] within the statutorily pro-
tected categories.”301  Having come to expect to enjoy that property 
right (and those revenues), copyright owners form incentives to create 
accordingly.302  Thus, it does not help to say that courts should find 
fair use “[w]hen no incentive purpose would be served by giving 
plaintiff protection, and where no disincentive would be created by 
allowing defendant free use.”303  Increasing the reach of the fair use 
doctrine itself would create such a disincentive,304 thus trapping the 
defense in a circularity of expectation. 
The solution to the problem of fair use is to make the defense less 
central to the enterprise of creation, not more.305  The problem with 
fair use is not that the defense is too narrow, but that the rights to 
which it makes an exception are too broad.  Say Congress were to nar-
row these rights by amending section 106 of the Copyright Act to give 
copyright owners only the exclusive right “to distribute copies of the 
copyrighted work to the public.”306  Acts of copying, standing alone, 
300 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
301 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1651. 
302 See Cohen, supra note 47, at 509 (“Self-evidently, this broad property-as-profit 
rule protects the status quo distribution of entitlements and wealth; a right insulated 
by a penumbra of monetary expectation will be relatively impervious to legislative 
change.”). 
303 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1618; see also Fisher, supra note 133, at 1687 (“The fair 
use doctrine enables the judiciary to permit unauthorized uses of copyrighted 
works . . . when doing so will result in wider dissemination of those works without seri-
ously eroding the incentives for artistic and intellectual innovation.”); Justin Hughes, 
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 777 (2003) (“[T]here is recognition that 
permitting too much adverse economic impact under fair use would undermine copy-
right’s incentive structure.”); Weinreb, supra note 44, at 1150 (noting the “broad 
agreement that a determination of fair use should depend largely, if not exclusively 
on . . . utilitarian assumptions about the copyright scheme,” including the question of 
whether “the use interfere with copyright incentives to creative authorship”). 
304 See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 141 (“Copyright owners will invest no more in 
producing copyrighted works than they can expect to profit from them, and if the 
profit horizon is systematically lowered by fair use, investment will be correspondingly 
lower.”). 
305 But see Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 61, 89 (1998) (“[T]he role of fair use is broader and more central to the over-
all structure of copyright law.”). 
306 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2000) (granting “the exclusive rights . . . (1) to re-
produce the copyrighted work . . . ; [and] (3) to distribute copies . . . of the copy-
righted work”). 
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would not constitute prima facie infringement, and therefore acts of 
copying, standing alone, would be legal without resort to the fair use 
defense.  This would be of obvious benefit to Google and its Library 
Project:  while Google has reproduced copyrighted works in their en-
tirety, it has not provided the public with anything more than a few 
“snippets” of those works, rendering any public distribution de mini-
mis.  In other words, because Google has not caused the publishers 
any competitive harm in the relevant market (here, in books), its ac-
tions would not violate section 106 as amended.  With the publishers 
unable to make a prima facie case of copyright infringement, Google 
would prevail without having to invoke the fair use defense, and with-
out having to argue for a tortured interpretation of the word “trans-
formative.” 
If the Copyright Act had looked like this in 1976, when Universal 
Studios sued Sony in the district court,307 then Universal, too, would 
have failed to make its prima facie case because Sony was accused of 
contributing to acts of copying—not acts of public distribution.308  
Universal having failed to prove copyright infringement, Sony would 
not have pressed the fair use defense; the Supreme Court would not 
have grappled with the question of whether home taping of television 
programs was “fair”; Justice Powell, who “felt that home use should be 
deemed fair use,”309 would not have cobbled together an opinion to 
that effect; litigants, judges, and scholars would have been spared the 
burden of trying to distinguish or breathe life into the holding in 
Sony; and hundreds of copyright articles never would have been writ-
ten.  Some of these consequences might not be beneficial, of course; I 
leave it for the reader to decide. 
307 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. 
Cal. 1977). 
308 Thus, Professor Stacey Dogan is correct in stating that “Sony’s exemption for 
noncommercial copying . . . would not have shielded the vast majority of unauthorized 
file sharing at issue in today’s peer-to-peer wars.”  Sony, Fair Use, and File Sharing, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 971-72 (2005).  Sony involved private copying via home video 
recorders, not the sort of public distribution that so characterizes p2p.  Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984). 
309 Litman, supra note 78, at 929.  Unfortunately, scholars would be deprived of 
Professor Litman’s wonderful article telling the story of the Sony case before the Su-
preme Court. 
  
2007] COPYRIGHT AS TRADE REGULATION 959 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that in the name of “en-
courag[ing] . . . learning”310 by inducing acts of creation, lawmakers 
are using copyright law to satisfy demands for private rights at the ex-
pense of other public interests in copyright.  Those other public in-
terests include, of course, public access to copyrighted expression, but 
they also include open and populous markets in expression as well as 
expressive diversity.  At times, some of these interests may conflict:  
giving creators (and their assigns) the right to exclude the public 
from using copyrighted works necessarily would inhibit at least some 
access; yet promoting free competition in the market for copyrighted 
works likely would undermine the inducement of creation.  I have 
proposed to mediate these conflicts by conceiving of copyright law as 
a prohibition against acts of unfair competition, whether by producers 
or consumers. 
Under this conception, copyright infringement would consist of 
the infliction of “competitive harm” in a “relevant market.”  I have de-
fined these terms by asking what rights creators are entitled to expect 
to enjoy when they engage in the act of creation.  Those rights would 
vary by type of work.  As regards “printed works” (i.e., works created 
for the purpose of existing in more than one copy), I have argued that 
creators are not entitled to expect the right to exclude others from 
engaging in acts of private copying because these acts, standing alone, 
do not create market substitutes to any significant extent.  Instead, I 
have argued that those creators are entitled to expect only the exclu-
sive right to distribute copies of those works to the public—as if, for 
example, section 106 of the Copyright Act were to provide copyright 
owners only with the exclusive right “to distribute copies of the copy-
righted work to the public.”  As Professor Patterson once put it, “if 
copyright encourages creation, it does so only for the purpose of 
profit.  Profit, however, cannot be obtained without distribution.”311
Because this profit depends on public distribution, acts of public 
distribution are behaviors that threaten to cause competitive (i.e., 
public) harms.  But acts of copying are not.  For too long, lawmakers 
have sought to punish private behaviors (like acts of copying) on the 
theory that copyright exists to maximize the earnings, and therefore 
the incentives, of the producers who subsidize acts of creation.  As we 
310 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
311 Patterson, supra note 51, at 7. 
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have seen, however, copyright also exists to provide the public with 
meaningful access to diverse forms of expression from an abundance 
of sources.  Google is proposing to provide such meaningful access, 
and there are thousands of ordinary users who might provide such di-
versity and abundance.  The only thing standing in their way is a copy-
right law that presently ascribes legal significance to public and private 
acts alike, regardless of the impact of those acts on the market in cop-
ies of copyrighted works.  It is time for lawmakers to conceive of copy-
right law not as a means of granting property rights, but as a means of 
using property rights to promote fair competition in the marketplace 
of expression. 
 
